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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 67 SEPTEMBER 1981 NUMBER 6
PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONAL CONTRACTS*
Charles J. Goetz** and Robert E. Scott***
RECENT scholarship has demonstrated that a significant pro-
portion of private contracts do not easily fit the presupposi-
tions of classical legal analysis." One reason for this is the pivotal
role played in conventional legal theory by the concept of the com-
plete contingent contract. Parties in a bargaining situation are pre-
sumed able, at minimal cost, to allocate explicitly the risks that
* We would like to thank Tyler Baker, Michael Dooley, Ernest Gellhorn, Victor Goldberg,
John Hetherington, Douglas Leslie, Saul Levmore, Harvey Perlnan, Alan Schwartz, and
Paul Stephan for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
** Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
*** Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
1 In the legal literature, Ian Macneil's pioneering scholarship has identified and described
a variety of contractual relationships that fall outside the boundaries of the classical "bar-
gain" model. See, e.g., Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Adjustment of Long-Term Relations]; Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Futures of Contract]. Many
others, of course, have recognized this largely uncharted territory. See, e.g., L. FRIEDmAN,
CoNTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963
Wis. L. REv. 3; Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. Rha. 131 (1970); Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); Summers, Collective Agree-
ments and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969).
In the economic literature, the work of Williamson, Goldberg, and others has been equally
instrumental in identifying the limitations of "friction-free" models in explaining contrac-
tual relationships whose purpose is to economize on transactions costs. See, e.g., 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975);
Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BE:LL J. EcON. 426 (1976); Goldberg,
The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 Tzx. L. Rzv.
91 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Vertical Restrictions]; Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contrac-
tual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Transaction-Cost Econom-
ics]; Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the




future contingencies may cause one or the other to regret having
entered into an executory agreement.2 Under these conditions, the
role of legal regulation can be defined quite precisely. Once the
underlying rules policing the bargaining process have been speci-
fied, contract rules serve as standard or common risk allocations
that can be varied by the individual agreement of particular par-
ties. These rules serve the important purpose of saving most bar-
gainers the cost of negotiating a tailor-made arrangement. If the
basic risk allocation provided by a legal rule fails to suit the pur-
poses of particular parties, then bargainers are free to negotiate an
alternative allocation of risks.3 All relevant risks thus can be as-
signed optimally-either by legal rule or through individualized
agreement-because future contingencies are not only known and
understood at the time the bargain is struck, but can also be ad-
dressed by efficacious contractual responses.
In a complex society, however, many contractual arrangements
diverge so markedly from the classical model that they require sep-
arate treatment. Parties frequently enter into continuing, highly
interactive contractual arrangements. For these parties, a complete
contingent contract may not be a feasible contracting mechanism.
Where the future contingencies are peculiarly intricate or uncer-
tain, practical difficulties arise that impede the contracting parties'
efforts to allocate optimally all risks at the time of contracting.
4
Not surprisingly, parties who find it advantageous to enter into
such cooperative exchange relationships seek specially adapted
2 It is the occurrence of a "regret contingency" that represents the true social cost of
executory contracting. The legal rules of contract facilitate the efforts of bargaining parties
to minimize and allocate optimally the risks of such contingencies. See Goetz & Scott, En-
forcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1271-88
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Enforcing Promises].
3 For a discussion of the economic justification underlying the risk-allocating rules of con-
tract, see Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Prin-
ciple: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 554, 554-77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Liquidated Damages].
4 The limits of human capacity to respond optimally to the external conditions of uncer-
tainty and complexity are explained by the concept of "bounded rationality." Simon defines
bounded rationality as behavior that is "intendedly rational, but only limited[ly] so." H.
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR XXviii (3d ed. 1976) (emphasis in original). Thus, when
transactions are conducted under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, it becomes ex-
tremely costly-if not literally impossible-for parties constrained by bounded rationality to
describe the complete decision tree at the time of bargaining. See 0. WILLIAMsoN, supra
note I, at 21-26.
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contractual devices. The resulting "relational contracts"5 encom-
pass most generic agency relationships, including distributorships,
franchises, joint ventures, and employment contracts.
Although a certain ambiguity has always existed, there has been
a tendency to equate the term "relational contract" with long-term
contractual involvements. We here adopt a very specific construc-
tion of the term that is based more precisely on a contrast with the
classical contingent contract. A contract is relational to the extent
that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the
arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive obliga-
tions may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain
future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex
adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves
can be identified in advance. As the discussion below illustrates,
long-term contracts are more likely than short-term agreements to
fit this conceptualization, but temporal extension per se is not the
defining characteristic. The contracts that we actually observe are,
of course, neither perfectly contingent nor entirely relational. Legal
theory has merely tended to concentrate on agreements that fall
close to the one polar extreme, while our focus in this article is
directed toward the other end of the continuum.
Conventional doctrine has failed to explain adequately the na-
ture and function of these relational contracts and how they differ
from more standard contracts. The resulting incomplete under-
standing is a prime source of costly litigation over the meaning and
enforceability of key provisions of such agreements. Much of the
litigation has centered on two doctrinal linchpins of relational con-
tracts: the obligation of one party (the "agent") to use its "best
efforts" to carry on an activity beneficial to the other (the "princi-
pal"), and the concomitant right of the principal to terminate the
relationship.6 Part I of this article describes how these core provi-
sions of relational contracts represent an optimizing response to
peculiar environmental constraints of complexity and uncertainty.
Appreciating the difficulty of ex ante regulation by contracting
' The terminology was first used by Professor Macneil. See Adjustment of Long-Term
Relations, supra note 1, at 886.
' Throughout this paper we use the terms "principal" and "agent" to refer to any rela-
tionship in which one party performs an activity on behalf of another. These terms are
merely convenient labels used in an informal sense and include independent contractors as
well as technical agency relationships.
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parties provides the basis, in Part II, for attaching a more precise
legal meaning to those contractual provisions that establish the
standard of future performance. Finally, Part III explores the rela-
tionship between these performance standards and other contrac-
tual provisions, particularly termination clauses. We conclude that
current uncertainty over the legal treatment of these provisions
impedes the ability of contracting parties to adjust to the special
conditions that induce relational contracting.
I. NATURE AND FUNCTION OF RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
Parties enter into relational contracts because such agreements
present an opportunity to exploit certain economies. Each party
wants a share of the benefits resulting from these economies and
consequently seeks to structure the relationship so as to induce the
other party to share the benefits of the exchange. Typically, this is
accomplished by specifying the performance standard of each
party and then selecting a mechanism to ensure compliance with
the agreed-upon standard.
In conventional contracts, the parties generally are able to re-
duce performance standards to rather specific obligations. By con-
trast, relational contracts create unique, interdependent relation-
ships, wherein unknown contingencies or the intricacy of the
required responses may prevent the specification of precise per-
formance standards.7 Complexity and uncertainty each play con-
ceptually distinct roles, although they frequently operate in combi-
nation. For example, suppose a homeowner attempts to write a
contract providing for the care of his fine home garden during a
summer when he is out of town. Uncertainty is represented by the
difficulty of determining in advance the climatic conditions, incur-
sions of the gypsy moth, wind-borne powdery mildew, etc. Com-
plexity is involved in specifying to the gardener exactly what re-
sponses should be made in each case: how much to spend on
sprays, whether to water, when a diseased plant should be cut
down to prevent infection of adjacent ones, and so on.
A typical response to this problem of complexity and uncer-
tainty is to define the performance standard in unusually general
terms. The ethical standards of attorneys, brokers, and other
See notes 22-27 infra and accompanying text.
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agents,8 the implied fiduciary obligation that attaches to certain
relational contractors, 9 and, most typically, "best efforts" clauses
are examples of how performance obligations are articulated in re-
lational contracts.10 Because these standards are usually described
in general terms, it is difficult to apply them in any specific con-
text. Therefore, relational contracts also require more creative con-
trol mechanisms than do conventional contingent contracts." In
any cooperative contract where performance obligations remain
imprecise, there are inevitable costs in ensuring that any particular
level of performance is achieved. Parties will bear this cost in vari-
ous ways. For example, they may grant the principal the right to
monitor the agent's efforts. Performance thus can be controlled by
direct supervision or by indirect incentive systems designed to en-
courage the agent to consider fully the principal's interests. Alter-
natively, in cases where monitoring is relatively costly, the agent
may seek to reassure the principal by a "bonding" agreement. 2
Liquidated damages provisions, covenants not to compete, and
unilateral termination clauses are common examples of agent
bonding. Ideally, the parties will select that combination of moni-
toring and bonding arrangements that optimizes the costs of gov-
' See, e.g., Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 172, 369 P.2d 933, 936 (1962) ("[A lawyer's]
fiduciary duty is of the highest order.., he must adhere to a high standard of honesty,
integrity and good faith in dealing with his client."); Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 952
(E.D. Va. 1959) ("[O]ne of the cardinal principles confronting every attorney . . . is the
requirement of complete loyalty and service in good faith to the best of his ability....
[A]n attorney should have no conflict of interest and... must devote his full and faithful
efforts toward the defense of his client."). See generally ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RE-
SPONSmiLrrY, Canon 5, E.C. 5-1 (1980).
See notes 83-94 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 60-82 infra and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Vertical Restrictions, supra note 1, at 99-103; Adjustment of Long-Term Re-
lations, supra note 1, at 889-95.
"I Professors Jensen and Meckling define "bonding" as an effort by an agent "to guaran-
tee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that
the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions." Jensen & Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANcrL.
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Agency Costs]. Jensen and Meckling were the
first to establish rigorously that contracting parties' incentives to economize on transactions
costs are reciprocal. Because the failure of the agent in any case to achieve an optimal level
of performance will be borne fully by the agent as a reduction in the "value" of his services,
both parties have a parallel incentive to reduce the divergence between ideal and actual




erning the standard of performance."3
Parties will enter into relational contracts only after considering
alternative methods of achieving their objectives. One obvious al-
ternative is the vertical integration of potentially separable activi-
ties, such as manufacturing and distribution, into a single firm. An
integrated firm presumably would take all the relevant cost and
benefit interactions of the two activities into consideration and
would provide the optimal level of manufacturing and distribution
inputs so that overall profits are maximized.14 The vertically inte-
grated firm thus provides a benchmark against which various alter-
native contractual arrangements can be measured. Vertical inte-
gration will be the optimal mechanism so long as the cost of
monitoring within the firm is less than the associated gain from
internalizing the costs and benefits of the combined activities
under integrated management.15 In many commercial settings,
however, vertical integration may not be a feasible alternative."
Consider, for example, an industry in which manufacturing and
distribution are specialized activities and are, at least potentially,
performed much more efficiently by separate firms. Where a single
integrated firm is no longer the exclusive decisionmaker, the re-
spective parties need to engage in a form of explicit adjustment in
order to ensure that the interactions between the manufacturing
and distributing activities will be considered properly. How, then,
can the parties trade in order to approach the optimal level of
23 See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
24 [IThe operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and al-
lowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct the resources, certain marketing
costs are saved. The entreprineur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking
into account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the
market transactions which he supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the
open market if he fails to do this.-. . . A firm, therefore, consists of the system of
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent
on an entrepreneur.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392-93 (1937).
"I See, e.g., id. at 394-95.
16 A variety of factors may make vertical integration less attractive than alternative con-
tractual devices. As Goldberg has recognized, these factors are not all related to production
efficiencies. Vertical integration may trigger costly forms of governmental regulation includ-
ing workmen's compensation, social security, and national labor relations standards that
franchisees can avoid. See Vertical Restrictions, supra note 1, at 96, 120. In addition,
Williamson suggests that transactions costs, and not productive efficiency, are of crucial




combined efforts analogous to that achieved by the integrated
firm?
We begin our analysis of this question by identifying some con-
ditions that produce variations in the nature and form of relational
contracting. For the sake of concreteness and ease of exposition,
the discussion will be carried on in terms of a "manufacturer" and
a "distributor." These are merely labels that conveniently describe
relative positions of the parties in a production chain. In any par-
ticular real-world situation, the appropriate terminology may vary:
franchiser-franchisee, supplier-fabricator, client-broker, etc.
A. Optimal Contractual Performance Under Certainty
Why do parties choose contractual forms that entail difficult
problems of control? The obvious answer is that, all things consid-
ered, they are more attractive than the available alternatives.
Consider the common situation where one party is the distribu-
tor of a product supplied, at least in part, by the manufacturer. As
an initial hypothetical case, assume that adjustments in distribu-
tion efforts are the only dimension of production influencing out-
put on the margin.17 (We relax this assumption subsequently in
order to examine relational contracts with several dimensions of
production activity where both parties must be encouraged to un-
dertake appropriate marginal adjustments.) 8 For expository sim-
plicity, we shall regard "distribution efforts" as units of product
distributed. Although product volume has the virtue of being a
clear and concrete conceptualization, the same analysis would ap-
ply if distribution efforts were reinterpreted to take the form of
any other volume or quantitative adjustment, including, for exam-
ple, quality level, advertising, or any other activity that affects
joint profits. 19 Assume also in this initial situation that the parties
17 For example, suppose that the cost and revenue conditions in the market are such that
incremental investments in "manufacturing" activities will not increase the quantity of
goods sold. This might occur where the manufacturer's costs of "manufacturing" were con-
stant over the relevant range and where adjustments in the activities of the manufacturer
(including promotion, advertising, etc.) were not likely to expand the market. Thus, based
on such existing and projected marginal manufacturing costs, the manufacturer is capable of
supplying profitably all of the goods required for any plausible level of distribution activity.
" See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
19 It may well be true that monitoring costs vary significantly with the nature of the pro-
ductive activity and the parties' risk preferences. See Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives
1981] 1095
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each know their own costs (but not necessarily the other party's
costs) and-know the external market conditions during the effec-
tive period of the proposed contract.
$1
FIGURE 1
in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. EcON. 55 (1979). These patterns, how-
ever, have no fundamental effect on the basic model presented here.
[Vol. 67:10891096
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In Figure 1, IMC represents the aggregate of the marginal costs
of "manufacturing" (MM) and of the marginal "distributing" costs
(the vertical distance between IMC and MM) where a firm carries
on both manufacturing and distribution as an integrated process.
If MR is the marginal revenue curve, then the intersection of MR
and IMC at b determines the output volume Q that maximizes
profits. In other words, Q and its associated profit level is the best
that the integrated firm can do by both manufacturing and distrib-
uting. The agent presumably enters the picture because he enjoys
a productive advantage over the manufacturer, such as lower mar-
ginal distribution costs as exemplified by MD in Figure 1. The
joint marginal cost curve JMC would result if the parties were able
to treat their separate costs as a single entity.
The potential savings from separate performance of their respec-
tive functions now provide the manufacturer and distributor with
an economic incentive to enter into a distributorship agreement.
Two predictions can be made as to the terms of an agreement
designed to exploit that potential. First, as Figure 1 suggests, the
parties will not have exploited all of the potential gains from trade
in the situation unless their agreement somehow calls for the man-
ufacture and distribution of quantity Q*, where the sum of the
marginal costs to the joint producers equals the marginal revenues
from sales. From any output other than Q*, a movement to Q* will
increase the combined profits of the parties. If, therefore, there are
no special impediments in the form of bargaining or other transac-
tion costs, one would expect to find contract terms facilitating this
"joint maximization" quantity outcome.
Second, certain limits can be placed on the minimum and maxi-
mum amounts that the distributor will pay to the manufacturer for
the predicted Q* units of the product. Each party must be at least
as well off under the contractual arrangement as it would have
been otherwise. Consequently, the manufacturer must receive at
least its additional manufacturing costs under the higher-volume
distributorship agreement plus the "go-it-alone" profits that it
would otherwise earn as an integrated firm.20 Graphically, these
sums correspond, respectively, to area ghij and triangle abc in Fig-
ure 1. The distributor would, in turn, be willing to pay a maximum
2" The manufacturer's expected profits as an integrated firm represent an opportunity
cost of the decision to enter into a distributorship arrangement.
1981] 1097
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of the total revenues from sales minus its distribution costs (area
kcdm). A range of indeterminancy exists because the gains from
trade (cost saving fabz + profits on expanded output zbd) must be
divided through bargaining between the parties. These potential
net gains from the distributorship arrangement are represented by
the shaded area in Figure 1.
On the bare facts presented above, one would not predict a best
efforts term or another flexible performance standard in the con-
tract. There simply is no need for it. Where the optimal output Q*
can be predetermined, a fixed quantity term would be a direct and
perfectly suitable mechanism for specifying volume. Furthermore,
fixed quantity terms and other precisely stated contractual obliga-
tions are generally the most efficient instruments for measuring
subsequent performance. Thus, under these assumed conditions,
the parties predictably will require the manufacturer to provide,
and the distributor to sell, Q* units of production. Suppose, how-
ever, that the curves depicted in Figure 1 are known only
probabilistically at the time of contract formation. How is the par-









B. Optimal Performance Standards Under Uncertainty
1. Fixed Quantity Terms
Even under uncertain conditions, there is still a determinate
output Q* that optimizes the parties' contractual relationship
based on essentially the same considerations discussed above. As-
sume, however, that this output must now be calculated with fu-
ture cost and revenue information known only imperfectly by the
parties at the time of contract formation. One approach would be
to retain the fixed quantity term in the contract, specifying the
volume that maximizes the expected value of the joint profits
based on an ex ante calculation of the risks and their associated
probabilities. Such a determinate volume, however, will always
turn out to be "wrong" at the time set for performance.
In Figure 2, for example, a distribution contract is negotiated in
the context of but a single contingency-the future imposition of a
particular governmental regulation. Assuming that governmental
regulation increases costs and that the probabilities of imposition
and nonimposition are equal, quantity E will represent the fixed
quantity term that maximizes the expected value of the exchange
at the time of contracting. Nevertheless, output E will always be
inferior to some other output level. If the regulation is imposed,
quantity Q1 will be the optimal output and the actual profits will
diverge from the optimal profits by the cross-hatched area A in
Figure 2. On the other hand, if the regulation is not imposed, opti-
mal profits at volume Q2 will exceed actual profits by the amount
represented by the shaded area B. The forgone profits constitute
"error costs." Under any conditions of uncertainty, an obligation
designed in advance to be optimal on average will tend always to
be wrong in the particular situation that ultimately pertains. In
either case, therefore, the difference between actual and optimal
profits is the error cost incurred by the parties from couching their
agreement in terms of a fixed contractual quantity.2 1
Of course, the parties are not required to set a single output
term. In Figure 2, if the uncertainties about costs and revenues are
21 Because the probabilities of the alternative regulatory conditions are equal, the error
costs of each situation receive equal weight in generating an expected value for any fixed
contractual quantity. Note, however, that the error-minimizing quantity E is not necessarily
halfway between Q, and Q2; the precise result depends both on the probability weights and
on the slopes of the cost and revenue curves.
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tied to a set of objectively verifiable contingencies that are few in
number, the volume called for in the contract may be "keyed" to
those uncertain future events. Thus, the parties can agree to quan-
tity Q1 if the regulation is imposed and, in the alternative, specify
quantity Q2 in the absence of regulation. Any increase in the com-
plexity of the risk factors or any greater uncertainty about the fu-
ture, however, will substantially increase the risk that any fixed
volume contract will specify the "wrong" output. Such contingent
volume agreements thus represent an intermediate point between
the complete contingent contract and more complex forms of rela-
tional exchange.22
2. Sequential Contingent Contracts: Responses to Strategic
Behavior
One response to increasing levels of complexity or uncertainty is
to limit the temporal scope of the contract. By negotiating a series
of recurring contingent contracts, the parties can reduce the error
costs of specifying fixed obligations.2 But in many cases the per-
formance of the initial agreement will produce specialized, idiosyn-
cratic skills. Assume, for example, that the parties agree to a one-
year distribution contract for a determinate quantity of the manu-
factured product. Once the distributor learns the skills peculiar to
the distribution of the manufactured product in the market area,
he enjoys a comparative advantage over the market of unskilled
agents.2 4 The distributor then has an incentive, when the contract
2 Indeed, contingent volume terms can be found in many real-world contractual arrange-
ments. As may be inferred from the brief treatment above, their relative attractiveness is
determined largely by the empirical conditions that confront the contracting parties.
23 Placing time constraints on the risks being assigned, by arbitrarily limiting the dura-
tion of the contract, will reduce both the amount of uncertainty as to the magnitude of
future regret contingencies and the extent of the decision tree required to assign these risks
optimally. This explains, for example, why many sales contracts between suppliers and pro-
ducers are negotiated as sequential contingent contracts even where the parties enjoy a
long-term "relationship." Furthermore, so long as the performance of such sales contracts
does not create firm-specific skills, the problem of strategic bargaining does not arise upon
renegotiation because the contractors are able to use the market as a means of monitoring
the value of performance.
24 These contract-specific skills will often take the form of investments in human capi-
tal-knowledge and experience concerning the distribution of the particular product within
the particular marketing area. Of course, contract-specific investment need not be limited to
human capital. An identical result would occur where the distributor makes a specialized
physical capital investment-e.g., building a distribution outlet at a strategic location within
1100 [Vol. 67:1089
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is renegotiated the following year, to secure a larger compensation
for similar efforts in order to exploit the advantage gained by his
"on the job" training. On the other hand, his newly acquired skills
can be exploited fully only if he remains as the manufacturer's rep-
resentative. Thus, as specialization occurs, each party becomes
more vulnerable to strategic demands by the other.25 When the
contract is renegotiated, the bargaining stakes are greater and both
parties have incentives to use strategic or opportunistic behavior in
order to secure a larger slice of the enhanced contractual "pie.
'2 6
The threat of excessive renegotiation costs will, in turn, induce
both parties to invest in alternative arrangements as precautions
against the anticipated strategic behavior. The essence of the prob-
lem is that, even where perfectly substitutable trading parties are
initially available in a competitive market, the increasing speciali-
zation of the parties vis-a-vis each other produces a species of bi-
lateral monopoly. Continuance of the original relationship becomes
increasingly desirable in order to exploit the accrued specialization
advantages, but the division of those gains must be bargained out
in a noncompetitive environment.
A more substantial problem exists when specialized investments
yield deferred returns. For example, the manufacturer often will
agree to compensate the distributor at a standard rate over the
the marketing area.
'5 The strategic advantage gained by the owner of contract-specific investments lies in the
opportunity cost to the other contracting party of the next best available contractual substi-
tute. Thus, the opportunity to threaten not to renew the relationship increases in potency in
direct proportion to the divergence between the value of the distributor's skills in this con-
tract and the next best distribution substitute. The distributor cannot sell his contract-
specific skills to other manufacturers. On the other hand, the manufacturer cannot secure
an equivalent value if he tries to sell the distribution license to another distributor. If both
parties were informed of the value of the idiosyncratic transaction to the other, the opportu-
nity for strategic bargaining would be reduced. These magnitudes typically will be a matter
of speculation, however, thus increasing the parties' incentives to make opportunistic claims.
These strategic opportunities have efficiency consequences as well as redistributive effects,
because both parties can be expected to invest in precautionary measures up to the point
where the expenditures in precautions are equal to the expected cost of the other's opportu-
nistic demands. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 1, at 298-302.
26 Williamson defines opportunism or strategic behavior as "self interest with guile." See
Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 1, at 234 n.3. Opportunism includes bluffs, threats,
and games of "chicken" designed to exploit another party's presumed bargaining disadvan-
tage. Whether such behavior is independently "wrongful" depends on additional variables.
Our point here is simply that the parties themselves have incentives to reduce the expected
cost of the behavior.
1981] 1101
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entire expected life of the agreement. Thus, during the initial
training period, the distributor will be "borrowing" against his fu-
ture sales capacity in order to finance his human capital invest-
ment. A reciprocal analysis would apply where the distributor has
invested in physical capital-equipment, inventory, etc.-that can-
not be amortized completely during the term of the contract. In
both cases, the financing of specialized investments creates asym-
metrical vulnerability to the threats of dissolution for one bar-
gainer or the other at different times during the life of the
relationship.
There are specific contractual mechanisms that can be used to
reduce the costs of such investment asymmetry. A covenant not to
compete is a common agreement that provides security for the
manufacturer's investment in on-the-job training. Similarly, a pro-
vision that requires the manufacturer to "buy back" inventory and
equipment offers the distributor a guaranteed market for his spe-
cialized physical capital. In many circumstances, however, limita-
tions on the effectiveness of such specific controls on strategic op-
portunities will induce the parties to restrict themselves mutually
in a long-term contract.2 7 Thus, the opportunities for strategic be-
havior can be minimized by ex ante negotiation of a compensation
package that extends over the expected life of the relationship.
Such a fixed term contract, however, reintroduces uncertainty and
complexity and reduces the parties' ability to arrive at accurate
and specific performance standards in advance.
a. Requirements Contracts
As an alternative, the parties may enter into a requirements
contract, thus confronting the problem of strategic behavior by en-
couraging competition in the market for manufacturers and dis-
tributors. Under this kind of arrangement, the manufacturer is ob-
ligated to supply each distributor with the product quantity it
"requires," but does not offer any particular distributor the exclu-
27 The utility of convenants not to compete is limited by the restrictive legal treatment
accorded such agreements. See generally Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valu-
able Information, 9 J. LEGAL STn. 683, 684-88 (1980). "Buy back" provisions are freely
enforceable, but the repurchase terms are difficult to specify accurately for the very reasons
that motivated the parties to negotiate such a relational contract. The parties will have
incentives to invest in specific monitoring mechanisms to the point where the cost of such
precautions equals the expected reduction in the cost of strategic behavior.
Relational Contracts
sive right to a marketing area. The requirements contract permits
marginal adjustments in distribution efforts by the distributors be-
cause the quantity "required" will vary as conditions change over
time.2" The advantage of this arrangement lies in the use of a com-
petitive distribution market to monitor any individual distributor's
"requirements." The availability of close market substitutes for
any particular distribution contract will prevent any single distrib-
utor from using contractually based discretion to extort special ad-
vantages. In addition, where there are substitutes for the manufac-
turer's product, the ability of distributors to switch products will
curtail strategic behavior by the manufacturer.2
b. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
Frequently, however, the profit-maximizing level of distribution
activity cannot be achieved in a market characterized by unre-
strained competition. The conditions that characterize a natural
monopoly-substantial fixed costs coupled with relatively modest
marginal costs, or restricted market size-occur in many relational
contexts, especially when the distribution takes place in spatially
limited submarkets. When classical natural monopoly conditions
arise, the economies of scale associated with an activity are not ex-
ploited fully unless the number of firms is limited, possibly even to
a single distributor. Under these conditions ordinary requirements
contracts are inefficient as well as unstable. The manufacturer will
" The distributor does not have unlimited flexibility to adjust his requirements. Output
and requirements contracts were often subject to judicial limitation at common law on the
theory that unfettered discretion suggested a lack of mutuality of obligation. See, e.g., Mow-
bray Pearson Co. v. E.H. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 187 P. 370 (1920); Hoffmann v. Pfing-
sten, 260 Wis. 160, 50 N.W.2d 369 (1951). Modem courts and the Uniform Commercial
Code, however, have validated such indefinite quantity agreements by implying both good
faith limitations on opportunistic behavior and a quantity range based on prior dealings or
some other relevant context. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1), Comment 2. See generally Weistart,
Requirements and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the UCC, 1973 DuKE L.J.
599.
2 A competitive distribution market at the initial contracting stage will not necessarily
remain competitive over time. As the relationship develops with individual distributors,
transaction-specific capital investments ultimately may produce the bilateral monopoly
problem that impairs sequential contingent contracting. In such cases, exclusive dealings
assignments emerge over time as competitors abandon the market. This occurs, we suggest,
because natural monopoly conditions exist in many distribution markets. Either the size of
the market or the existence of large economies of scale following capital investment will
generate equilibrium in the long run only when a single distributor remains.
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examine the market and conclude, either because economies of
scale are large or market size is limited, that having a single dis-
tributor is the most profitable arrangement. If he licenses more
than one distributor, the potential returns from the distribution
arrangement will be diminished because competition among dis-
tributors will produce an inefficient investment in distribution
activities.30
Under these conditions, the parties may agree to an "exclusive
dealing" contract in which the manufacturer will offer the distribu-
tor exclusive rights within a defined market. The exclusivity of
these rights creates a relationship of dependence and vulnerability
for the manufacturer during the life of the contract. In response,
the manufacturer generally will attempt to limit his vulnerability
from the exclusive arrangement by securing the agent's promise to
use his "best efforts" to promote sales.$1 The tensions inherent in
such a situation are obvious. If a sequential contingent contract is
negotiated, the parties once again expose themselves to future stra-
tegic demands for increased compensation. Alternatively, if the
compensation agreement extends for the life of the relationship,
either the parties must specify an "erroneous" fixed-volume term
or the manufacturer will be vulnerable to a failure by the distribu-
tor to extend those "best efforts" that were paid for in the original
30 Competition will produce inefficiencies, for example, if the distributors elect not to
make optimal capital investments in distribution activities because the opportunity to cap-
ture fully the benefits of such investments through increased economies of scale is blunted
by the existence of competitors in the market area.
3 Frequently, the "best efforts" obligation will be undertaken explicitly where the parties
agree to an exclusive dealing arrangement. Such explicit agreements, however, merely con-
firm the obligation implied by law in the absence of specific agreement. In the ordinary
requirements contract, the distributor's efforts are constrained by "good faith" and prior
practice. Both common law courts and the Uniform Commercial Code, however, imply an
additional obligation to use "best efforts" to promote sales where the agreement specifies an
exclusive dealings arrangement. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118
N.E. 214 (1917); U.C.C. § 2-306(2), Comment 5.
This implied obligation to use "best efforts" is consistent with the increased vulnerability
of the manufacturer in the exclusive dealing arrangement. Where the seller relinquishes his
right to market his goods through a competitor, most parties would assume that the buyer
would agree to exercise a correspondingly greater effort to provide a market because, we
suggest, such increased efforts would produce a larger contractual "pie" for the parties to
divide. See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text. Thus, the legal rule implying "best
efforts" in exclusive dealings contracts is merely another illustration of the principal func-
tion of contract rules: to provide common or typical risk allocations, thereby saving most




In the simple model described above, where a manufacturer li-
censes a single distributor, the exclusive licensing agreement is ad-
equate to induce an optimal investment in distribution activities.
More typically, however, the manufacturer will license a number of
distributors, granting each a form of access to a limited submarket.
Once a network is established, the parties face a second-order "free
rider" problem. Optimal distribution activity will frequently in-
clude pre-sales advertising and promotion. Yet, any individual dis-
tributor will be reluctant to invest in such services where the pro-
spective customers can learn about the product through one
distributor's promotion efforts and then purchase the product
from another distributor. To protect the integrity of the distribu-
tion network, therefore, parties to an exclusive dealings arrange-
ment typically will bargain for territorial restrictions on the mar-
ket each distributor is entitled to serve. These restrictions serve to
prevent a distributor from "poaching" on either the customers or
the distribution efforts of other distributors in the network.2
3. Indirect Monitoring Mechanisms: Price Adjustments
As we have suggested above, where contractually fixed quantity
terms are not an effective means of achieving joint profit max-
imization, the parties instead may specify a flexible performance
32 Contractual restrictions between manufacturer and distributor, of course, are subject to
scrutiny under the antitrust laws. Under current law, manufacturer restrictions on the dis-
tributor's resale prices are per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Dr. Miles Medi-
cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). But cf. United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (resale price maintenance not a Sherman Act violation if enforced
by refusals to deal). Since the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), non-price contractual restrictions
imposed by a manufacturer-such as territorial limitations-are no longer per se illegal, but
are subject instead to the broader rule-of-reason test. These restrictions, which facilitate
contractual marketing strategies in lieu of vertical integration, obviously allow the parties to
maximize the benefits of private contracting, and, in that sense, are reasonable. The anti-
trust literature, however, reflects the widespread belief that various market imperfections
produce a divergence between private and social costs. Whether these external anticompeti-
tive effects justify a continuing examination of vertical restrictions depends largely on one's
view of the enforcement costs associated with such scrutiny. See generally Bork, Vertical
Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171; Vertical Restrictions, supra note 1,
at 112-17; Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHr. L. REv. 1 (1977); Assessing Vertical Restrictions, supra note
1; Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Laby-
rinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out? (forthcoming in 67 VA. L. lav.).
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standard such as the "best efforts" obligation. This arrangement,
however, will require some system of monitoring the level of effort
undertaken by the distributor or agent. Direct monitoring is feasi-
ble in contexts such as franchising where operating procedures are
standardized and one agent's efforts can be compared to those of
similar agents. Indeed, franchisors may retain vertically integrated
distributional outlets in representative locations in order to pro-
vide benchmarks against which franchisee operations can be
compared. 3 Such direct forms of monitoring may not always be
practical, however. Under many circumstances, discretionary dis-
tribution efforts can be better controlled by indirect means. One
indirect instrument for adapting volume to uncertain future condi-
tions is the proper calibration of the marginal price between the
manufacturer and the distributor. Because the distributor has de
facto control of the maximum volume sold by the parties, the ob-
jective should be to set pricing terms that will induce the distribu-
tor to choose a close approximation of the optimal quantity Q* at
all times, even when he is nominally free to choose any volume
level at all. Marginal cost to the distributor is the sum of his own
marginal distribution costs plus the marginal contractual price
payable to the manufacturer. In practice, this "price" typically will
be termed a royalty, license fee, franchise fee, or some other term
appropriate to the business context. Because the distributor will
choose the output that equates marginal cost with marginal reve-
nue (MC = MR) in order to maximize his own profits, a proper
calibration of price by the manufacturer can induce selection of
the Q* optimal output. The optimal output will be chosen volunta-
rily by the distributor only if his marginal costs can be made to
approximate the aggregate marginal costs of distribution and man-
ufacturing (MD + MM), i.e., what we previously have termed the
joint marginal costs.
a. Profit-based Pricing
One useful contractual scheme is to provide for sales to the dis-
tributor at marginal manufacturing costs (MM), but then to re-
3Although manufacturer-owned distribution outlets have been scrutinized under the an-
titrust laws as anticompetitive, the monitoring advantages of establishing a vertically inte-




quire the distributor to pay over to the manufacturer some share
(K) of the distributor's net profits in the form of a franchise fee,
license, or royalty. Marginal cost to the distributor then becomes
MC = MD + MM + K [MR- (MD + MM)]
and leads automatically to the selection of Q*. This result will oc-
cur because the distributor's own profit maximization calculus will
lead him to expand volume until
(1-K) [MR - (MD + MM)] = 0,-"
where the square-bracketed term is the increment in joint profits
and (1-K) is the fractional share of those joint profits that the dis-
tributor is allowed to keep. Indeed, (1-K) may be reinterpreted as
a fractional "commission" payment paid over to the distributor or
agent out of the proceeds of any sales. The above formulation di-
rectly reflects the common sense purpose of this pricing scheme,
because it illustrates why the distributor cannot maximize his own
profits without also fully exploiting any opportunities for joint
profits as represented by the square-bracketed term. In addition, a
simple algebraic manipulation demonstrates that the formulation
implicitly yields a result wherein MR = MD + MM, which is the
underlying general condition for joint profit maximization: margi-
nal revenue equals marginal cost where both costs and revenues
are summed over all affected parties.
Unfortunately, there are numerous practical drawbacks to the
implementation of a profit-sharing arrangement such as that just
described. One limitation is that the pricing scheme requires infor-
mation on the manufacturer's marginal costs. Because accurate in-
cremental cost information is much harder to acquire than total
cost information, the parties may not wish to tie the contract to
magnitudes that are costly to ascertain or otherwise impractical to
monitor. This limitation is less important when marginal manufac-
turing costs are either insignificant in magnitude or closely approx-
imated by average cost, which is a more readily ascertainable
value. For instance, marginal "manufacturing" costs frequently are
negligible when the "manufacturer" is providing only a license
34 The equation states the marginal condition for profit maximization. It does not imply
that profits will be zero at the optimal point but rather that adjustments in efforts will not
generate more profits. k
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rather than some actual product.
Even though the distributor's costs and revenues need-at least
in theory-to be measured only in totals in order to arrive at the
profits figure upon which the contractual payments are based, the
distributor's treatment of costs may create problems. The diver-
gence between accounting costs and economic costs may confuse
profit measurement. One example of this is the exclusion of
"fixed" costs as economic costs. 5 Perhaps most important is the
problem of monitoring and segregating costs and revenues within
multi-product firms where it becomes increasingly difficult to
monitor the allocation of joint costs-overhead, etc.-that may be
shifted strategically among various contracts.36 A multi-product
distributor has an incentive to impute as many costs as possible to
those activities where his share of net profits is lowest.
Similarly, the distributor may "pad" costs, disguising his own re-
turns and denying profits to the manufacturer. For instance, the
distributor may provide himself with unnecessary amenities, such
as a "company car," or place relatives on the payroll at unwar-
ranted salaries. Gross abuses, of course, will be easy to detect, but
cost padding can take a variety of subtle forms that are extremely
difficult to discover and perhaps impractical to prove.
b. Sales-based Pricing
Given the enhanced monitoring burdens of profit-based pricing,
it is not surprising that relational contractors frequently choose
alternative pricing arrangements. Commonly observed, for exam-
ple, are initial flat fee payments coupled with royalty payments
35 Under conventional "absorption" cost accounting, fixed production costs are included
as part of the costs of production. In economic or "marginal" costing, only variable manu-
facturing costs are regarded as production costs; fixed production costs are treated as period
costs and released immediately as an expense. Compare 1 C. HORNGREN & J. LEER, CPA:
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTIONS 114 (4th ed. 1974) with P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS
466-67 (10th ed. 1976). Obviously, the magnitude and allocation of fixed costs will influence
the net "profits" produced by the distributor's efforts.
36 The significant monitoring problems raised by profit sharing arrangements have been
underlined recently by the widely publicized efforts of actors Fess Parker, James Garner,
and Robert Wagner and Natalie Wood-all of whom had negotiated profit-based pricing
agreements-to recover damages for the failure of seemingly successful television shows
("Daniel Boone," "Rockford Files," and "Charlie's Angels") to return any profits at all. See
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
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tied to a percentage of gross sales." These arrangements reduce
the costs of monitoring the distributor's expenditures but, in turn,
also reduce the congruence of interests concerning optimal output
between the manufacturer and the distributor. Once the distribu-
tor's return is reflected in a sales-based pricing mechanism, there
is an inherent conflict of interest between the contracting parties
over profit-maximizing output. As we demonstrate in Part II, the
distributor's self-interest will induce him to produce a lesser quan-
tity than the manufacturer's interests would demand. 8 Thus, these
more common pricing arrangements reduce the burden of monitor-
ing the agent's costs and revenues, but increase the burden of
controlling the agent's level of effort. Presumably, firms choose
sales-based pricing because the cost of monitoring the level of
effort is perceived as less than the cost of monitoring operating
expenditures.3
4. Mutual Adjustments by Exchanging Efforts
In contrast to the preceding discussion, which assumed that the
only relevant dimension of activity was distribution effort, profit-
maximizing levels of sales in many relational contexts can be
achieved only if the efforts of both parties are adjusted. In
franchising, for example, although the franchisee must expand his
distribution efforts, optimal volume also depends on the efforts of
the franchisor to advertise the product and to monitor the system
to ensure appropriate product quality.
40
Whenever there are two dimensions of an activity that require
adjustment and only one instrumental variable, the optimal output
can be reached only by coincidence. Assume, for example, that in
addition to distribution efforts, marginal adjustments in advertis-
ing efforts by the manufacturer are also necessary to reach optimal
quantity Q*. Under these conditions, no combination of a sale or
37 Indeed, sales-based royalty payments are the prototypical pricing scheme in relational
agreements.
See notes 50-53 infra and accompanying text.
31 In addition to reduced monitoring costs, there are additional benefits that accrue from
using a sales-based royalty arrangement in certain instances. See note 42 infra and accom-
panying text.
40 Policing the network in order both to prevent violations of territorial restrictions and
to maintain quality control is simply an additional application of the free rider problem
associated with exclusive dealings arrangements. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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transfer of rights in the manufactured product will produce the
ideal level of both manufacturing and distribution activity.41 This
is because the manufacturer would want the distributor to "dis-
tribute" as if he owned all of the property rights in the product,
while the distributor similarly would want the manufacturer to un-
dertake the same effort as if he also owned all of the rights. In
such contexts, the parties must exchange "efforts" in order to max-
imize their joint gains. Consequently, division of rights to the
product of that effort is only an imperfect and insufficiently potent
substitute for the ideal behavioral incentives.
When regulation of the effort level of both parties is required,
the implications of the pricing scheme must be reconsidered. For
instance, Rubin discusses the superiority of profit-based systems
over flat-fee payments when the objective is to stimulate the ef-
forts of the manufacturer. 4 A similar analysis might be conducted
of sales-based versus profit-based royalty schemes. Generalization
about which system would be superior is quite complex and fact-
dependent, however. The common sense principle is that one is us-
ing sales or profits as a proxy for the kind of effort to be stimu-
lated. Hence, the choice of sales or profits as a base depends on
which correlates more closely with variations in the level of the
kind of activity being regulated.
In sum, in cooperative ventures where each party's profits are
dependent on the quantity or quality of the other party's efforts,
efficient exchange requires that each party pay the other to under-
take the optimal level of the respective activity. Although the ex-
change of efforts offers parties in bilaterally interactive ventures
" The limitations of using a single variable to influence optimally two dimensions of an
activity can be be observed in numerous contexts. The negligence/contributory negligence
formulation is one example where optimal risk avoidance requires both parties to act as if
each one bore all the costs of the particular activity. Similarly, fines in a system of private
enforcement of criminal penalties cannot be calibrated so as to influence optimally both the
level of enforcement and the level of criminal activity. See Landes & Posner, The Private
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 39 (1975).
42 See Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.
L. & EcoN. 223, 228-30 (1978). Although Rubin compares the incentive effects on
franchisors of profit-based royalties as opposed to flat-fee payments, the observation has
greater generality. The closer each party's interest approximates the joint interests of both
parties, the smaller the divergence between the actual efforts and the optimal level of adver-
tising, policing, distributing, etc. As we suggest below, however, because both parties need




the opportunity to exploit fully the benefits from their exchange,
actually securing those gains in costly environments poses signifi-
cant contractual dilemmas. The following section examines typical
contractual responses to these problems.
II. DEFINING THE STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE
Perhaps the most poorly understood class of relational contracts
is that involving agreements wherein one party explicitly, or even
implicitly, undertakes the contractual duty of using its "best ef-
forts" to carry on an activity beneficial to the other. Some of the
most common illustrations of such best efforts agreements are
found in agency, licensing, franchising, and other distributorship
arrangements. 43 Notwithstanding the frequency with which such
terms are observed empirically, the precise legal meaning to be at-
tached to a best efforts requirement is not at all clear, either from
a consideration of the case law or from theoretical discussions in
standard legal scholarship. 4 Nevertheless, there appears to be a
relatively straightforward and persuasive definition that emerges
from the preceding economic conceptualization of the problem
faced by two parties who are attempting to set a contractual vol-
ume in which they have joint interests.
In this section, we relate judicial discussion of the best efforts
term to the economic model already developed. We argue that the
best efforts cases hinge on two factors, strategic adaptation to the
conflict of interest between the parties and the problem of mana-
gerial incompetence. These elements may, of course, coexist in a
single case. Because the courts appear not to have distinguished
these factors clearly, it is not surprising that existing case law has
been unhelpful in working out a consensus about the legal rule.
41 This list is by no means exhaustive. Best efforts obligations are also used commonly to
govern employment contracts, corporate relationships, joint ventures, insurance agreements,
leaseholds, trusts, publishing contracts, and partnerships. See generally cases cited note 72
infra.
4' Surprisingly, although scholarly inquiry has focused on related issues-particularly the
nature of fiduciary responsibilities-no coherent analysis of the nature of best efforts obliga-
tions has been undertaken. For a sampling of some of the related legal scholarship, see
generally Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738 (1978); Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 369 (1980); Adjustment of Long-Term Relations,
supra note 1; Summers, supra note 1.
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A. A Best Efforts Model
Figure 3 illustrates a contract in which the distributor faces a
marginal cost curve (MC) composed of his own marginal distribu-
tion costs (MD) plus the marginal "price" (R) negotiated with the
manufacturer. In addition, it is assumed that the payment takes
the form of a fifty-percent royalty on gross sales.45 Absent any
other information, one might expect that the distributor would
then legally be entitled to choose volume Q where his marginal
costs (MC = MD + R) are equal to marginal revenues (MR). This
is the point at which the distributor's own profits are maximized.
If he were required to sell an additional quantity beyond Q, the
distributor's profits would be reduced, as exemplified by the
shaded triangle A in Figure 3. Suppose, however, that there were
some way in which he could oblige himself to adjust to the joint
maximization output that we have previously identified at Q*. In
exchange for such an undertaking, which at the time it is accepted
represents a loss to the distributor, the manufacturer should be
willing to agree in advance to a compensatory contractual conces-
sion through which the two parties can split the additional profits
generated by the higher volume.46 These profits are represented by
the cross-hatched triangle B in Figure 3.
45 Figure 3 may be confusing initially because it illustrates a downward-sloping marginal
cost curve composed of marginal distribution costs and payments to the manufacturer. The
marginal cost curve is graphically correct, however, as can be confirmed by adding one-half
the marginal revenue curve (which also slopes downward) to the marginal distribution curve
at every point.
4' The assumption implicit in this model is that a legal right to require the distributor to
distribute more goods than his self-interest would dictate at the time of performance will
have been paid for by the manufacturer, implicitly or explicitly, at the time of contracting.












1. Optimal Volume Definition
The obligation to produce at the joint maximization volume is
the meaning that we propose for the best efforts term in commer-
cial contracts. This interpretation of the best efforts provision has
a great deal of theoretical attractiveness because, absent the speci-
fication of an alternative construction by the parties, it directs the
outcome that maximizes the net gains that parties could achieve
from their contractual relationship. In sum, it is a plausible means
of identifying a goal presumably desired by most parties, albeit not
always well articulated. In any case, business people need not be
regarded as thinking explicitly in terms of the precise marginal
conditions and other terminology of economic theory.
In addition, the definition suggested above is consistent with a
"fairness" obligation of the kind formulated by distributive justice
theorists. 7 Under this conception, the distributor is required to
treat the manufacturer "fairly," giving the manufacturer's interests
(profits) equal weight with his own when output decisions are
made. Moreover, such special consideration presumably has been
paid for in advance by the manufacturer in the form of some com-
pensatory concession.48
In any specific fact situation, some retreat from the rigorous def-
inition suggested above may be entirely appropriate. For instance,
the duty of the best efforts promisor to take into consideration the
other party's interests should be limited by the promisor's reason-
able ability to foresee the extent of those interests. Thus, a failure
by the distributor to account fully for the manufacturer's idiosyn-
cratic accounting methods that unexpectedly reduce joint marginal
costs and increase the additional volume necessary to reach Q*
would not establish a breach of the best efforts obligation. This
limitation is in the same spirit as the damage limitation rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale,49 because it compels a party with unan-
ticipatable interests to supply the information necessary for eco-
47 This joint maximization conception of the obligations of individuals in cooperative en-
deavors-which assumes a present agreement to treat collective interests equally in the fu-
ture-can be derived from the contractarian "original position" postulated by Rawls and
other ex ante justice theorists. See J. RAwLs, A THmoRY OF JUSTUCE 347-50 (1971).
48 See note 46 supra.
49 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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nomically efficient behavior.50 Those parties with atypical or idio-
syncratic requirements remain free to negotiate an individually
tailored understanding of the best efforts obligation.
Unfortunately, a best efforts obligation, as defined above, inher-
ently implies a serious monitoring problem. This is illustrated in
Figure 3 where shaded triangle A represents the reduction in prof-
its suffered by the distributor because he is obligated to produce at
Q* rather than Q. Hence, the best efforts promisor generally will
have a strong economic incentive to "chisel" on the obligation. In a
world of cost-free information, such breaches of the best efforts
requirement would be easily detected, and the behavior restrained
through the legal damages imposed for breach of contract.5 1 In a
real-world situation, however, the requisite information for proof
of liability or quantification of damages may be prohibitively ex-
pensive to obtain, especially when the plaintiff bears the burden of
such proof. Hence, the standard legal mechanism may not be a via-
ble one for enforcement of this kind of contract provision.52
Where recourse to the courts is not an attractive option, these
economic considerations suggest that a best efforts promisee-such
as the manufacturer-will attempt to contract for other means of
controlling the standard of performance." Presumably, the self in-
terest of both contracting parties will induce them to seek out that
50 See Enforcing Promises, supra note 2, at 1299-1300.
51 Contract damage rules embrace a variety of remedial choices. . . . In most cases A
can seek the value of what he expected from B's promise. Such standard "compensa-
tory" recovery puts A in the economic position he would have occupied had B ful-
filled his obligation. There are alternatives to the compensation rules, however. Thus,
A may seek restitution of any benefit conferred on B as a result of B's promise. Alter-
natively, A may seek to recover identifiable costs incurred in reliance on B's promise.
Recovering conferred benefits and reliance expenditures has the stated objective of
returning the parties to the same economic position they occupied before the promise
was made.
Id. at 1263 (footnotes omitted).
52 We have suggested that a best efforts obligation is a contractual mechanism typically
used to govern a bilateral monopoly relationship characterized by unique, contract-specific
skills. Thus, breach of such a contract is peculiarly impervious to accurate measurement and
proof whenever the best efforts obligation diverges from market substitutes. Because the
best efforts term represents an attempt to improve on market alternatives, market substi-
tutes by definition will be an-inexact measure of the distributor's obligation. Only when a
competitive market generates prices indicating the value of forgone opportunities is there
reliable evidence of the position the manufacturer would have occupied had the best efforts
obligation been performed.
11 See Futures of Contracts, supra note 1, at 781-82.
1981] 1115
Virginia Law Review
combination of monitoring or bonding arrangements that repre-
sents the optimal tradeoff between expected costs of contractual
governance and profits forgone because the ideal output Q* is not
enforced perfectly.54 As the cost of contract-specific monitoring
strategies increases, the price of contracting to the best efforts
promisor similarly increases. The best efforts promisor has an in-
centive, therefore, to propose cost-effective bonding agreements
that reduce the costs of contractual control, thereby lowering the
contract "price" paid by him. The "price" reductions might take
the form of a reduction in the initial license payment required by
the manufacturer, or a reduction in the royalty paid to the manu-
facturer on the contractual product or, indeed, any other adjust-
ment in contract terms favorable to the distributor.
A commonly observed form of bonding is a termination privilege
that could be invoked by the manufacturer if he detects a breach
of the best efforts obligation. Moreover, the parties might be ex-
pected to negotiate a termination clause that granted the manufac-
turer considerable discretion as to the circumstances under which
termination would be permitted. If, instead, the termination clause
were only triggered by specific events, any attempt to exercise it
might create precisely those problems of proof that the clause orig-
inally was designed to circumvent. A limited right of termination
embodies less reassurance of contractual performance and would
presumably induce some compensatory increase in the contract
"price" paid by the distributor. As we shall elaborate in the follow-
ing section, a discretionary termination clause is not an ideal safe-
guard.55 Often, however, it is a mutually beneficial adaptation to
the inevitable conflict of interest generated by a best efforts
agreement.
Although the best efforts result Q* is in theory a clearly optimal
result for the parties, the realities of enforcement, especially when
coupled with the inherent chiseling incentive, may dim the practi-
cal attractiveness of such agreements. Nevertheless, the problems
arising in legal regulation of such agreements should not be viewed
as dispositive. Many contractual provisions are honored even
where there is no effective legal sanction for their breach. 6 In
" See note 12 supra.
" See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
" For a discussion of the effects of extra-legal sanctions on the optimal enforcement of
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some circumstances, this is due to the existence of informal, extra-
legal sanctions, including a sense of commercial ethics.57 Notwith-
standing practical difficulties of securing legal enforcement, there-
fore, a contractual provision also has value simply as a communica-
tion of understanding between the parties as to their mutual rights
and duties. Hence, the inclusion of a best efforts term may, at a
minimum, serve as a signal alerting good faith bargainers that the
proposed contractual relationship is one in which special concerns
are to be considered.
Where courts are compelled to attach a meaning to otherwise
ambiguous contractual terms, it is sensible to look to the likely in-
tent of the parties or the goal the parties might reasonably be
deemed to have sought. The "optimal-output" definition of best
efforts is, we argue, the single most plausible interpretation of the
underlying economic motivations involved. This proposed meaning
of best efforts need not be seen as describing what the contracting
parties actually intended in any particular case. Rather, it is
designed to offer a plausible way in which the legal rule can allo-
cate unknown risks in advance of individual bargaining, thus re-
ducing the uncertainty costs of an imprecise legal standard.
2. Best Efforts as Diligence Insurance
Although the optimal-output interpretation may be the single
most persuasive meaning for best efforts, one plausible alternative
definition merits discussion: best efforts requires the exercise of
due diligence and ordinary business prudence.58 Under this alter-
promissory obligations, see Enforcing Promises, supra note 2, at 1271-73.
'7 See generally Macaulay, supra note 1. In his classic study of extra-legal sanctions in
business contexts, Professor Macaulay observed: "Disputes are frequently settled without
reference to the contract or to potential or actual legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to
speak of legal rights or to threaten to sue in. . . negotiations" in order to avoid jeopardizing
the goodwill value of established business relationships. Id. at 61. See also Farnsworth, The
Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLuM. L. Rav. 576, 605 (1969).
The due diligence obligation is not incorporated within the commonly accepted param-
eters of the obligation of good faith, even as it attaches to a merchant. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b),
for example, defines good faith in the case of a merchant to include, in addition to honesty
in fact, the exercise of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." (em-
phasis added). Although this expanded definition incorporates an objective test of "cheat-
ing" behavior, it does not address the additional issue of competence. Hence, it is plausible
to suppose that parties would seek to allocate this additional risk through some other con-
tractual provision such as the best efforts clause.
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native conception, a breach of the best efforts obligation would ex-
ist where the distributor's efforts diverge from the standard of dili-
gent or reasonably prudent business conduct.
In terms of Figure 3, our previous analysis has focused on the
losses from a shortfall between the optimal volume Q* and the dis-
tributor's profit-maximizing output Q. It is interesting, however, to
consider also the case where the distributor chooses an even lower
output than Q, such as Q1 in Figure 3.
Why would the distributor ever choose an output of less than Q
if, under the cost and revenue conditions for the product he sells,
the quantity Q represents his point of maximum profitability? One
of the simplest explanations is to reinterpret Figure 3 as containing
"objective" cost and revenue curves as they would exist for a typi-
cal distributor. The cost and revenue functions underlying the ac-
tual output calculus of any particular distributor may diverge
greatly from the objective, either because of truly subjective ele-
ments such as misapprehension of the market or due to more con-
crete factors such as carelessness or incompetence in restraining
production costs. The distributor, either through misapprehension
or incompetence in restraining costs, perceives marginal cost to be
MCI and selects volume Q1. Whatever the reason for the distribu-
tor's failure to serve even his own interests competently, the manu-
facturer understandably will be distressed if the original agreement
was predicated on his perfectly reasonable expectation that the ob-
jective circumstances experienced "should" have motivated a vol-
ume of at least Q.
For at least two distinct reasons, it makes good economic sense
that the distributor would be the efficient bearer of the risk of
both his own and the manufacturer's lost profits from sales forgone
due to business mistakes on the part of the distributor. First, the
distributor is the party who has effective control of his own level of
care invested in undertaking business activities and, hence, has the
opportunity to adjust that level of care to the cost-effective extent.
Second, the distributor is in a better position to assess ex ante his
own capability to achieve the ordinary or expectable level of busi-
ness performance. Consequently, inclusion of the best efforts term
might be construed as an explicit allocation of all risks associated




For expository ease, we shall refer to this interpretation of best
efforts as the "diligence insurance" definition. Such a conception
of the meaning of best efforts is not an unattractive one and pro-
vides at least a minimal standard for the term. One can argue per-
suasively, however, that the diligence standard properly is sub-
sumed within the optimal output definition. This result is
suggested when one attempts to give rigorous content to the ques-
tion of precisely how much diligence is required. The response is
that the obligation is to use a cost-effective amount, to, in lay
terms, "do the prudent thing, taking into account the interests of
both parties" in a manner similar to that mandated by the negli-
gence standard in tort law. This is only another way of expressing
the original fundamental insight that the parties can benefit mutu-
ally when the distributor acts as a joint maximizer.
Once it is granted that the parties are motivated by a concern to
maximize the joint contractual product, it seems odd to restrict
that kind of reasoning to a single aspect of the business relation-
ship. On the one hand, one can be diligent and produce an "erro-
neous" or nonoptimal output such as the distributor's profit-maxi-
mizing quantity Q. On the other hand, the obligation to produce
the jointly optimal output is easily understood as an all-encom-
passing optimality condition, directly mandating the "correct" re-
sult in objective terms. Because the two interpretations spring
from essentially the same underlying principles, we prefer the one
with greater generality.
B. Applying the Model: "Best Efforts" in the Courts
A search for the meaning of a best efforts obligation in terms of
traditional legal doctrine is not very illuminating. Early common
law courts were reluctant to sanction the use of such an ambiguous
obligation, finding best efforts agreements vague, indefinite, or il-
59 The present value of a risk (r) is the product of the probability of its occurrence (p)
and its expected impact (i). Thus, r = pi. Therefore, the two critical variables that suggest a
risk-bearing advantage are: (1) the ability to control the level of investment in precautions
in order to undertake the optimal amount of risk avoidance, thereby producing cost-effec-
tive reductions in p, and (2) the ability to assess the likely impact of the risk in order to
determine the optimal level of insurance, thereby optimizing i. In this case, both of these
variables suggest that the distributor enjoys the comparative advantage in risk bearing. See
Liquidated Damages, supra note 3, at 579-83.
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lusory and thus lacking in mutuality of obligation. Although
pockets of resistance to legal enforcement remain," the majority of
courts now concede that such obligations represent a substantial
and legally enforceable obligation between the parties.6 2 Finding a
generalizable meaning to be attached to the best efforts obligation,
however, has proved more difficult. A typical judicial construction
i§ that the term "takes its meaning from circumstances," but that
it at least requires the promising party to "merchandise products
in good faith and to the extent of its own total capabilities."68
A more revealing sense for the judicial debate over best efforts
can be gleaned from a close examination of those cases in which
such a standard of performance was the basis of decision. The re-
cent leading case of Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.64 provides an
insightful illustration of this case law. Bloor was trustee in bank-
ruptcy for the plaintiff Ballantine Beer Company. Falstaff had
contracted to take over marketing of the Ballantine brand in ex-
change for a lump sum payment to Ballantine of $4,000,000 plus
royalties of fifty cents per barrel. The contract required that Fal-
staff "use its best efforts to promote and maintain a high volume
of sales" of the Ballantine brands.6 5
At trial, both the parties and the court manifested an awareness
of the diligence insurance concept of best efforts. A first level of
dispute between Ballantine and Falstaff was whether to apply an
objective or subjective standard of best efforts to Falstaff's mar-
keting performance. Falstaff attempted to excuse itself by virtue of
its allegedly precarious business position. Ballantine argued that
hardship does not excuse performance of a contract, urging the
standard of an "average, prudent, comparable" brewer." The trial
60 See, e.g., Bay v. Bedwell, 21 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Barton v. Spinning, 8
Wash. 458, 36 P. 439 (1894) (listing early cases).
61 See, e.g., Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263
(1912); Kraftco Corp. v. Kolbus, 1 M11. App. 3d 635, 639, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1971) ("the
term [best efforts] is too vague to be fairly intelligible and too lacking in certainty to be
enforceable"); Goodman v. Motor Prods. Corp., 9 Il. App. 2d 57, 132 N.E.2d 356 (1956).
" See cases cited notes 72-77 infra."
83 See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
affl'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.).
6 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affl'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.).
65 Id. at 260 (quoting contractual language).
68 Ballantine's argument was taken from Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 176
F. Supp. 862, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aflrd, 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962). In Arnold, the plaintiff
argued that best efforts imposed an obligation on the defendant distributor to select the
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court did not reach the merits of this issue, finding that "Falstaff
failed to use even its own temporarily circumscribed abilities and.
resources to promote the sale of Ballantine products. ' 67 Neverthe-
less, in commenting on Falstaff's specific excuse that a mishandled
labor negotiation explained its failure to exploit a 1975 profit op-
portunity, the court noted that "Ballantine may not be charged
with Falstaff's negligence in failing to terminate its labor contracts
properly."68
Would it have been acceptable conduct if Falstaff had been dili-
gent, but had looked exclusively to its own profit interest? Quoting
an analogous case involving a publisher's promotional efforts, the
court recognized that mere self-interested diligence is not always
sufficient:
"Although a publisher has a general right to act on its own inter-
ests in a way that may incidentally lessen an author's royalties,
there may be a point where that activity is so manifestly harmful
to the author and must have been seen by the publisher so to be
harmful, as to justify the court in saying there was a breach of the
covenant to promote the author's works.""
Indeed, the court similarly rejected the notion that Ballantine Beer
need only have been treated evenhandedly with the defendant's
own Falstaff product.70
The appellate court's affirming opinion rejected more emphati-
cally the notion that even-handed treatment of the two brands dis-
charged Falstaff's best efforts obligation:
While that [best efforts] clause clearly required Falstaff to treat
the Ballantine brand as well as its own, it does not follow that it
required no more. With respect to its own brands, management
was entirely free to exercise its business judgment as to how to
most remunerative possible method of distribution. Id. at 865. The district court disagreed,
requiring instead an objective evaluation of what a "comparable" distributor might have
produced. Id. at 866. Recasting the debate in the terms used in this paper, the court was
unprepared to agree that "best efforts" required the distributor to consider only the licen-
sor's interests, and instead imposed a standard that incorporated potentially both the "dili-
gence insurance" and "optimal output definition" suggested above.
67 454 F. Supp. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269 (quoting Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 34, 46, 281 N.E.2d 142, 145, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 334 (1972)).
70 Id. at 271.
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maximize profit, even if this meant serious loss in volume. Because
of the obligation it had assumed under the sales contract, its situa-
tion with respect to the Ballantine brands was quite different. The
royalty of $.50 a barrel on sales was an essential part of the
purchase price.7 '
As the Bloor case illustrates, courts seem aware that something
more than the distributor's profit-maximizing volume Q is required
to satisfy a best efforts obligation. It is not so clear, however, that
the courts have adopted the optimal output Q* as the performance
standard to be applied in the absence of contrary agreement. One
reason why the precise dividing line between breach and satisfac-
tory performance is not delineated more finely seems to be that
most of the litigated cases where a breach has been established are
characterized by obvious and substantial failures of performance
by the best efforts promisor. Typically, the defendant is found to
have engaged in one or more fairly gross instances of nonfeasance
or malfeasance.7 2 Most courts faced with resolving best efforts dis-
putes have not been required, therefore, to articulate in any detail
how the interests of the two parties are to be balanced. Of course,
if all cases were gross instances of nonperformance, some uncer-
tainty about the precise standard of liability might be tolerable. It
is equally plausible, however, that the current ambiguity has sim-
ply created an onerous de facto burden for plaintiffs that can be
overcome only in cases of substantial breach.
73
At least in theory, the standard of performance required of a
best efforts promisor could be inferred from a court's damages
71 Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609, 614 (2d Cir. 1979).
712 See, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.
1977) (music publishing); Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976) (patent licensing); Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115
F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1940) (same); Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), affd, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (beer distribution); Van Valkenburgh, Nooger &
Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 281 N.E.2d 142, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329
(1972) (book publishing); Freeman v. Danal Jewelry Co., 397 A.2d 1323 (R.I. 1979) (employ-
ment contract).
" This intuition is confirmed by the significant number of cases in which allegations of a
breach of best efforts have failed for lack of proof. See, e.g., Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt
Assoc. Inc., 584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978); Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962); Weaver v.
Mid-America Distrib. Corp., 309 So. 2d 370 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Vondras v. Titanium Re-
search & Dev. Co., 511 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Insurance, Inc. v. Sanders, 378
S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
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calculus. Even in cases of flagrant breach, a fully compensatory
damages award requires a court to compare the value of actual per-
formance to that of an adequate best efforts performance. Unfor-
tunately, the damages computations in cases finding a violation of
best efforts do not clarify the performance standard being applied.
For instance, in Bloor the court awarded damages projected from
the behavior of "comparable" brands that were marketed by inte-
grated non-royalty-paying firms. Thus, the "comparable brand"
volume behavior could be regarded as a good proxy for the joint-
maximization outcome for the Ballantine-Falstaff contractual com-
bination. There is, however, no real indication in the decision that
use of integrated firms as comparable entities was understood or
intended in this way. Unless the court was properly sensitive to the
economic implications of the fact that the integrated firm situation
is the de facto equivalent of a joint maximization result, its choice
of the comparable firms could be interpreted just as easily as being
based upon a diligence insurance or ordinary malfeasance theory of
liability.
74
There remains, however, one line of best efforts cases in which
the various issues subsumed in most best efforts litigation can be
isolated more successfully. These cases involve disputes arising
when the best efforts promisor engages in activities that directly
compete with the promisee's contractual objective. Because the dil-
igence insurance question is not in issue, the competition cases
present a clearer opportunity to apply the joint-maximization
model developed above.
An illustration of the competition cases may be instructive. As-
sume that a law book publisher enters into an exclusive publishing
agreement with Professor A. By the terms of the publishing con-
tract, the publisher promises to use its best efforts to promote the
sale of Professor A's text. One year later, however, the publisher
brings out a competing text written by Professor B. Subsequently,
sales of Professor A's text decline by fifty percent. It is tempting to
argue that permitting the hypothetical law book publisher to issue
a competing text necessarily would be inconsistent with the opti-
mal volume meaning of best efforts. This seems particularly true if
the evidence also reveals that the publisher promoted the second




text as being superior to the first. Yet, even in this circumstance,
the competitive activity is not necessarily inconsistent with joint
maximization principles. Indeed, a breach of the optimal best ef-
forts standard cannot be established unless the facts also demon-
strate that the market substitute had been developed by the pub-
lisher in order to further its own interests at the expense of author
A. Such a breach was held to be clearly established, for example,
where a virtually identical competing text was written "in house"
at the behest of the original publisher and at a substantially re-
duced royalty payment.75
Assume, however, that Professor A can establish only that the
publisher failed to instruct its sales people to promote the books
evenhandedly and, left to their own devices, the sales people en-
couraged sales of author B's text. Although unequal promotion
may create a prima facie case of failure to use best efforts, under
our hypothetical situation the publisher would still be pursuing a
joint-maximization objective so long as B's book was promoted be-
cause there were real underlying gains to be derived in the market.
For instance, if B's text potentially would have been produced by
another publisher, introduction of the text by the best efforts obli-
gor carries no liability. In such a case, the publisher's forebearance
from earning profits on B's book would not be matched by any
concomitant gains to author A.
The competition cases reveal a sensitivity by the courts to limi-
tations inherent in a best efforts obligation. Most courts have held
that the introduction of a competing product by the best efforts
promisor is not a per se breach of the contractual arrangement.7 6
Efforts in competition with the best efforts promisee have been
found to violate the contract only where they demonstrate the
agent's failure to consider the principal's interest equally with his
own. 7 Indeed, mere dissatisfaction by the manufacturer with the
7' Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 281
N.E.2d 142, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1972).
76 See, e.g., Parev Prods. Co. v. L Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1941)
(distribution license); Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 34, 281 N.E.2d 142, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1972) (book publishing); Wolf v. Illus-
trated World Encyclopedia, Inc. 41 A.D.2d 191, 341 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1973), affl'd, 34 N.Y.2d
834, 316 N.E.2d 342, 359 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1974) (same). Cf. Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co.,
212 Mass. 352, 99 N.E. 221 (1912) (automobile distribution).
7 See, e.g., Foster v. Callaghan & Co., 248 F. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Van Valkenburgh,
Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30 N.Y.2d 34, 281 N.E.2d 142, 330
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distributor's level of effort is not symptomatic of a best efforts vio-
lation. Under almost any pricing arrangement it is plausible that
the manufacturer will want the distributor to expend additional
efforts beyond the optimal volume Q*.7S Best efforts, however,
does not require the agent to consider the principal's interests ei-
N.Y.S.2d 329 (1972); Genet v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 136 N.Y. 593, 32 N.E. 1078
(1893).
78 This possibility is illustrated in Figure 4 below, a smaller version of Figure 3. Recall
that the distributor is required by contract to pay the manufacturer a royalty equal to 50%
of gross sales. Thus, the marginal revenue curve facing the manufacturer (1/2 MR) is equal
to one-half the marginal revenue curve faced by the distributor. If MM represents the mar-
ginal cost of manufacturing, then the manufacturer will prefer quantity Qm to the joint
maximization quantity Q*. Area C represents the additional profits earned by the manufac-
turer if output is expanded from Q* to Qm.
A word of caution, therefore, is in order: evidence suggesting that additional distribution
efforts would have earned the manufacturer greater profits is not prima facie evidence of a
best efforts breach. The manufacturer may not "see" all of the costs associated with
distribution.
$ 1
Q Q* Qm Quantity
FIGURE 4
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ther ahead of or instead of his own interests. 9 Rather, as was rec-
ognized in Petroleum Marketing Corp. v. Metro Petroleum
Corp.,0 such an interest-balancing approach requires that same
level of effort as though the agent owned the entire contractual
interest. The hypothetical integrated ownership established as the
performance standard in Petroleum Marketing is equivalent to the
joint-maximization criterion proposed above.8 1
Whenever the best efforts issue is raised in specific litigation, it
is tempting to argue that imposing the optimal output obligation
on the best efforts promisor is "unfair" unless the evidence clearly
suggests that he has been paid in advance to produce beyond his
own profit-maximizing objective. In an uncertain legal environ-
ment, however, such evidence rarely will be available. It is simply
not clear under the current rule what particular bargainers actually
intended by a best efforts obligation. These uncertainty costs can
be reduced only by adopting a clear rule that encourages parties to
signal their disagreement by negotiating variant interpretations.
The optimal output definition can be supported on both distribu-
tional and instrumentalist bases if it represents-as we have ar-
gued-the outcome most parties would reach if they bargained ex-
plicitly over the issue in advance.82
C. Implied Fiduciary Obligations: Alternative Performance
Standards
The best efforts obligation is not the only performance standard
commonly found in relational contracts. For a variety of coopera-
tive arrangements-including attorneys, brokers, executors, fac-
tors, partners, and joint venturers-the performance obligation of
the parties is described in terms of a general fiduciary responsibil-
ity. Although these relationships may or may not be long-term,
79 For example, courts have not compelled the agent to enter into a "hopeless contest."
Eclipse Bicycle Co. v. Farrow, 199 U.S. 581, 589 (1905). See also Parev Prods. Co. v. I.
Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147, 150 (1941) (agent not required to sell "come what
may").
8o 396 Pa. 48, 151 A.2d 616 (1959).
8 "[Dlefendants had the duty at least to use such effort as it would have been prudent to
use in their own behalf if they had owned the receivables, or such effort as it would have
been prudent for the plaintiffs to use if they had retained possession of them." Id. at 51, 151
A.2d at 619.
82 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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they nonetheless are properly analyzed as relational contracts be-
cause they tend to be characterized by uncertainty about factual
conditions during performance and an extraordinary degree of
difficulty in describing specifically the desired adaptations to con-
tingencies. In such relationships, where the obligor occupies a posi-
tion of special confidence, superiority, or influence,8 3 a "special
duty" exists to protect the interest of the other.84 Unlike the best
efforts obligation, the fiduciary obligation has a well-developed
doctrinal foundation. Fiduciaries are required, inter alia, to act
"primarily for the benefit of another on matters relating to the
undertaking."8 5
To what extent, then, does the joint maximization model inform
the meaning to be given to the standards of performance in fiduci-
ary relationships? Initially, several differences can be observed in
the doctrinal basis of fiduciary standards. First, the fiduciary obli-
gation of loyalty and fidelity is one that is stated in mandatory
terms. Rather than deriving its justification from the terms of the
contract itself, it is imposed as a condition of the relationship, irre-
spective of efforts by individual bargainers to negotiate an alterna-
tive standard.86 Second, fiduciary performance standards typically
are described with more demanding and uncompromising rhetoric
" "The fiduciary relation may exist wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the
relationship be that of blood, business, friendship, or association, by one person in another
when they are in a position to have and exercise ... influence over each other." Dawson v.
National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 376, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
84 See generally 5 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 495 (3d ed. 1967).
85 Nagel v. Todd, 185 Md. 512, 516, 45 A.2d 326, 327 (1945) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY § 13, Comment (a)). See also Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, 356 Pa. 244, 250, 51
A.2d 811, 813 (1947); Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 312, 34 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1941).
86 It is noteworthy that although the obligation of loyalty and "unqualified fidelity" is
mandatory, the parties are free by contract to define the specific duties required of the
fiduciary. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 760.
In Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1944), the court expressed this critical distinction in the
following terms:
The fiduciary has two paramount obligations: responsibility and loyalty ... The re-
sponsibility-that is, the care and the diligence-required of an agent or of a fiduci-
ary, is proportioned to the occasion. It is a concept that has, and necessarily so, a
wide penumbra of meaning ....
The concept of loyalty, of constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise
meaning. The fiduciary must subordinate his individual and private interests to his
duty ... whenever the two conflict.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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than is found in best efforts arrangements. For example, in Mersky
v. Multiple Listing Bureau, Inc.,7 the propriety of the sale of real
estate to a relative of an agent in the broker's firm was at issue.
The court stated:
Furthermore, there flows from this agency relationship and its ac-
companying obligation of utmost fidelity and good faith, the legal,
ethical, and moral responsibility on the part of the listing broker as
well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable care, skill, and judg-
ment in securing for the principal the best bargain possible; to
scrupulously avoid representing any interest antagonistic to that of
the principal in transactions involving the principal's listed prop-
erty, or otherwise self-dealing with that property, without the ex-
plicit and fully informed consent of the principal."
The plain meaning of such language seems to suggest an even
higher level of performance than the obligation to take both inter-
ests equally into account. Indeed, if attention is focused on the
parallel line of cases in which fiduciaries act in competition with
the interests of their clients, the courts have expressed far greater
reluctance in these settings than in commercial contexts to sanc-
tion such activities.89 For example, in Strickland v. Arnold
Thomas Seed Service, Inc.,90 the court found that the agent had
not sustained its burden of showing that sales in competition with
the seed pool that it represented were made "in the exercise of its
best judgment considering only the interests of the pool
members."91
Nevertheless, it is difficult to attach literal meaning to the con-
ventional legal statement of the performance standard owed by a
-' 73 Wash. 2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968).
Id. at 229, 437 P.2d at 899.
88 One of the earliest cases involving fiduciary competition is Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439,
20 A. 513 (1890), in which a stockbroker received some stock from the purchaser as well as a
commission from the seller. In discussing the rule that no agent can serve two principals, the
court noted: "It forbids that anyone intrusted with the interests of others shall in any man-
ner make the business an object of personal interest to himself.. . ." Id. at 442, 20 A. at
514. See also Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82 (1964) (law firm may
not accept any action against a person whom they are representing presently even though
there is no relationship between the two cases); Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis.
2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973) (secured party, an automobile dealer, could not resell the
secured car to itself without making good faith efforts to secure a "commercially reasona-
ble" price).
"' 277 Or. 165, 560 P.2d 597 (1977).
91 Id. at 177, 560 P.2d at 604 (emphasis added).
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fiduciary. Although the attorney, broker, or partner may be held to
the highest standards of fidelity to his client's interests, the fiduci-
ary clearly is not required to extend efforts to his client's behalf
regardless of the costs. Once it is recognized, however, that the
costs-the interests-of the agent are relevant, the same inevitable
question recurs: How are the relative interests of the parties to be
balanced in individual cases? If the question is posed in these
terms, a joint maximization definition of the required standard of
performance offers the interpretation that optimizes the fiduciary
relationship. Accordingly, the fiduciary would be required to act
with reference to his principal so as to apply that level of effort
which takes both the principal's and his own interests equally into
account. Imposing any higher standards on the fiduciary reduces
the social value of the relationship; mandating any level of effort
beyond the optimal point Q* would mean that the relationship
would be incurring unnecessary losses. Such a solution would, in
turn, be unstable in the sense that the parties would have an in-
centive to agree to a lesser standard in order to share the gains
derived from readjusting to the joint optimum level of effort.
Application of the joint-maximization model to fiduciary rela-
tionships is, despite a superficial dissimilarity, closely analogous to
the more commercial relationships first discussed. Formally, a cli-
ent who entrusts the pursuit of his cause of action to an attorney
stands in quite the same position as a patent-holder to his licensee
or an author to his publisher. The fiduciary is in control of the
level of efforts expended on the client's behalf; a conflict of inter-
ests over the proper level of efforts, similar to that discussed in the
manufacturer-distributor context, predictably will arise. Because
the conflict may reduce the value of the relationship, monitoring
and bonding arrangements may be desirable.
This interpretation does not imply that the exhortatory rhetoric
associated with fiduciary performance standards is devoid of sig-
nificance. It is plausible to hypothesize that the higher level of as-
piration in terms of fidelity and good faith that attaches to the
fiduciary's obligation represents a substitute for the more com-
monly observed termination agreements in commercial best efforts
contracts. 2 This is not to suggest that implied rights to terminate
91 A closer reading of the cases confirms this intuition. The anti-competition rule in fidu-
ciary relationships, for example, is justified as a means of policing against the enhanced risk
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cannot be associated with fiduciary relationships. Nevertheless,
even though implied rights of unilateral termination are found in
attorney-client and broker-client relationships," termination rights
may not serve the same reassurance function in these settings.9 It
is plausible, therefore, that the extravagant statements of fidelity
and obligation are substitute bonding provisions serving functions
similar to the termination authorizations in more commercial set-
tings. In Part III, we test this hypothesis by examining more rigor-
ously the use of termination clauses and their substitutes as mech-
anisms to control uncertain standards of performance.
III. ADJUSTING PERFORMANCE: TERMINATION AND ITS SUBSTITUTES
A. Optimizing Agency Costs
As we have emphasized above, relational agreements inevitably
involve costly conflicts of interest that may prevent the parties
from achieving a desired result. Contracting parties will seek
means of reducing such "agency costs" by establishing cost-effec-
tive monitoring or bonding mechanisms. Monitoring methods in-
clude direct supervision through auditing and pre-established stan-
dards of performance as well as incentive systems designed to
reduce conflicts of interest. 5 Thus, depending on the empirical re-
of cheating in fiduciary relationships. Thus, one court has noted:
[O]ne who has the power will be too readily seized with the inclination to use the
opportunity for serving his own interests at the expense of his principal.... It mat-
ters not that no fraud was meditated, and no injury done. The rule is not intended to
be remedial of actual wrong, but preventive of the possibility of it.
Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 442-43, 20 A. 513, 514 (1890) (emphasis added).
Substitute bonding provisions condemning self-dealing are also found in the self-imposed
ethical standards of attorneys and brokers. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BiLrrY, Canon 5, E.C. 5-2 to -13 (1980).
" See, e.g., Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959):
The special quality of a retainer contract is recognized by the cases holding that in
spite of section 474 of the Judiciary Law the client may terminate it at any time,
leaving the lawyer no cause of action for breach of contract but only the right to
recover on quantum meruit for services previously rendered.
Id. at 106, 160 N.E.2d at 48, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 497 (emphasis in original).
A partnership or joint venture organized for a definite term cannot be dissolved at the
pleasure of one of the partners. Dissolution in such instances is available only if "reasonable
cause" is shown. See, e.g., Cole v. Morley, 12 W. Va. 730, 747 (1878). For an analogous
problem of "illiquidity" restrictions on termination of close corporations, see Hetherington
& Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining
Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. Rav. 1 (1977).
" See Agency Costs, supra note 12, at 308-10, 323.
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alities, parties may find it advantageous to integrate vertically,
thereby invoking the complex network of internal controls on man-
agers and labor that characterizes the firm.96 Alternatively, parties
may select various forms of relational contracting such as franchis-
ing, distributorships, and joint ventures. Where the parties choose
private contracts rather than vertical integration, different moni-
toring patterns will be observed.
Monitoring arrangements are costly to both parties, and such
costs are reflected in the terms received by the agent in the origi-
nal contract.9 7 Agency cost, and thus the contract price, may be
improved by substituting reassurances of performance in the form
of bonding provisions. As we have suggested, among the variety of
possible bonding arrangements are capital contributions, covenants
not to compete, self-imposed ethical standards for agents, and uni-
lateral termination authorizations.'8
Perhaps the most important and controversial of these various
bonding arrangements is the unilateral termination clause. Al-
though the parties' choice of a termination clause suggests that
such a provision promises a reduction in agency costs, the termina-
tion of a distributor may have grave effects. It is tempting, there-
fore, to question the social utility of termination clauses because
they rarely are found in those relational contexts where employees,
franchisees, or other agents have engaged either in collective bar-
gaining or political activity. If a termination clause represents an
optimizing response to agency costs, presumably it would emerge
from collective activity as well as from individual bargaining. Most
collective bargaining agreements, however, include job security
provisions that prevent unilateral termination by employers.99
" See Alchian & Demsetz, Production Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62
AM. EcoN. REv. 777, 777-83 (1972).
Jensen and Meckling have established that agency costs-which reduce the value of the
agent's services to the principal-will be fully borne by the agent as reductions in the mar-
ket price of his services. Thus, the agent has a clear incentive to substitute bonding provi-
sions for monitoring activities where these adjustments will economize on agency costs. See
Agency Costs, supra note 12, at 313-19.
" The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Additional examples include performance
bonds and liquidated damages provisions that can be invoked against particularly obvious
and egregious breaches of agreed-upon standards of performance.
o Ninety percent of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the United States
contain some form of job security provision that limits the unilateral power of termination.
[1979] 2 COLLECTIvE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CoNTRAcTs (BNA) 40:1.
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Similarly, collective political action by franchisee associations has
produced good cause limitations on unilateral termination provi-
sions in franchise contracts.100 Prior to such collective action,
broad termination provisions were observed commonly in these
contexts, 10 1 and they continue to be widely employed in relational
agreements that remain unregulated. 02
Commentators have proposed a variety of hypotheses to explain
the apparent divergence between individual and collective goals.
One hypothesis is that individual agreements authorizing unilat-
eral termination are explicable in terms of the imperfect informa-
tion available to individual bargainers. Once individual bargainers
organize collectively, it is argued, they come to appreciate both the
value of job security and the relative costs of termination-at-will
provisions.103 As an empirical matter, this "myopia" hypothesis
seems quite implausible. The transactions costs of acquiring infor-
mation concerning the risks of termination do not appear different
from the information costs associated with many other contractual
risks allocated by private bargaining.
A more defensible hypothesis focuses on the change in market
conditions that follows a grant of cartelization rights to a group of
agents. First, collective recognition will increase, either implicitly
or explicitly, the total compensation paid to these bargainers be-
cause collective action permits them to demand more than they
could in a competitive environment. Second, cartelization of em-
100 Federal legislation includes the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act, Pub. L. No. 84-
1026, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976)) and the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2801-2806 (Supp. 1I 1979)). At the state level, as of June 1, 1978, 15 jurisdictions had
enacted legislation with general limitations on franchise terminations, 36 statutes limited
termination rights in vehicle franchise contracts, and 20 limited termination in petroleum
franchises. See STATE BusINss FRANCHISE DiscLosuRE AND RELATIONSHIP LAWS (CCH) 1 99
(1978).
101 Indeed, in employment relationships, as well as other contractual agreements with an
indefinite term, the common law presumes a right to terminate at will. See 9 S. WMLISTON,
A TR ATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 1017, at 129-37 (3d ed. 1967); note 107 infra and
accompanying text.
10' The termination-at-will rule, for example, continues to govern the majority of Ameri-
can workers who are not employed under collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Pear-
son v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964); Hablas v. Armour & Co.,
270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959).
103 See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816, 1830-33 (1980).
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ployees or other agents will also alter the prices they pay for indi-
vidual contract provisions, including the price of job security. For
example, under collective bargaining agreements, grievance proce-
dures and other enforcement measures uniformly are established
because collective action, by pooling risks, can reduce the costs of
these measures to individual employees. Reductions in enforce-
ment costs ultimately will increase the value of limitations on the
power of termination. Thus, it can be argued that in collective bar-
gaining contexts effective job security costs less than it does when
"purchased" by individual bargainers.10 4
Perhaps the most sophisticated hypothesis draws a distinction
between "average" agents, whose contractual preferences are domi-
nant in collective decisions, and "marginal" agents, whose prefer-
ences control the terms of individually bargained contracts. 0 5 Sup-
pose that an "average" agent, because he is older and more
established, faces relatively higher dislocation costs if terminated.
Average franchisees then would have incentives to seek legislative
limitations on franchise termination. Similarly, average employees
would bargain for good faith limitations on termination. In each
case, mandating the result favorable to the average agent reduces
the market impact of the marginal agent who, upon entering the
industry, would prefer to bargain for a termination clause as a sub-
stitute for alternative bonding devices.
A number of interesting implications flow from this conception
of the divergence between individual and collective agreements.
First, ex post legislation limiting termination of franchisees results
in a wealth transfer to those franchisees who "purchased" their
franchise with a broad termination clause. Second, such a change
makes it more expensive for prospective franchisees to "purchase"
distribution rights, assuming good cause legislation limiting termi-
nation cannot be waived by contract. Employment contracts are
affected similarly to the extent that termination limitations re-
strict "entry" by new employees, although to the extent that fu-
ture employment conditions must still be negotiated, the costs of
such provisions will be borne by all employees.
I" See Vertical Restrictions, supra note 1, at 124-25; D. Leslie, The Economics of Trade
Unions 24-25 (unpublished paper on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
1*1 See Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INTMREsT 69 (1979);
Vertical Restrictions, supra note 1, at 124-25; D. Leslie, supra note 104, at 24-25.
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At least the latter two hypotheses seem useful and interesting,
but they are not fully explanatory. Focusing on the contractual ob-
jective of optimizing agency costs may offer an additional insight.
It appears plausible that the conditions that produce collective ac-
tion parallel the conditions under which monitoring costs are low
relative to bonding provisions, such as the right to terminate. In
many labor agreements, for example, job performance can be rou-
tinized and described precisely, thereby reducing the employer's
costs of monitoring the efforts of employees. Indeed, where the la-
bor market involves specialized, idiosyncratic skills-e.g., perform-
ing artists or professional athletes-collective agreements do not
provide continuing job security for individual members. Franchise
agreements offer additional confirmation of this hypothesis.
Franchising arrangements require an extensive monitoring system
for policing the agent's qualitative performance in order to retain
the goodwill value of the franchise name and trademark.10 6 Once
extensive quality control is required, it becomes less costly to ex-
pand such control in order also to monitor quantitative efforts to
reach optimal output.
In sum, the attractiveness of termination clauses as a means of
enhancing assurances of performance will vary depending upon the
cost and availability of substitute methods of reducing agency
costs. Because varying factual circumstances will determine to a
large extent the relative value of substitute methods of controlling
and adjusting performance, this explanation of termination provi-
sions argues for permitting contracting parties to select freely that
combination of monitoring and bonding arrangements that opti-
mizes total agency costs. This necessarily assumes, however, that
the benefits of termination clauses in reducing agency costs are not
exceeded by the social costs of enforcing termination-at-will agree-
ments. In order to evaluate the costs of enforcing termination pro-
visions, we review the legal enforceability of such arrangements in
the following section.
B. The Legal Enforcement of Termination Clauses
1. The Common Law
The common law of contract provides a relatively straightfor-
106 See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING REALmEs AND REMEDIES 69-75 (2d ed. 1978).
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ward treatment of the termination of relational contracts. When
the agreement calls for successive performances, but is by its terms
indefinite in duration, it is terminable at the will of either party
upon reasonable notification.10 7 This implied right of termination
is subject to qualification in circumstances where the agent has
made a substantial capital contribution in the enterprise. An in-
vestment beyond mere efforts to perform provides the basis for im-
plying a reasonable duration to the agreement so that the agent
may recoup his initial investment.108 A legal rule implying a unilat-
eral right of termination in general, coupled with a recoupment
limitation in specific instances, is merely an application of the
well-recognized function of contract law to supply common or typi-
cal allocations of risk between contracting parties where their
agreement does not suggest a specially tailored arrangement.
The common law rule implicitly assumes, therefore, that termi-
nation at will, subject only to a recoupment limitation, is the result
most relational contractors would reach in the absence of specific
agreements concerning duration. It follows that an express provi-
sion between contracting parties authorizing either party to termi-
nate the agreement either at will or on specified notification ordi-
narily would be legally enforceable according to its terms. Indeed,
11 See generally 1 A. CoRIN, CONTRACTS § 96 (1963). In Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v.
Theatrical Stage Employees Local 16, 69 Cal. 2d 713, 447 P.2d 325, 73 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1968),
the court observed that:
While the initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing perform-
ance or forbearance which contain no express terms of duration, must always be that
of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties, in
some cases the nature of the contract and the totality of surrounding circumstances
give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term. In such cases the law usually implies
that the term of duration shall be at least a reasonable time, and that the obligations
under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice
after such a reasonable time has elapsed. This rule is generally applicable, for in-
stance, to exclusive sales agency and distributorship contracts.
Id. at 727-28, 447 P.2d at 335, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (emphasis added; citations omitted). See
also Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1972); Meadows v.
Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp.
400 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Garlock v. Motz Tire & Rubber Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N.W. 344
(1916); U.C.C. § 2-309(2).
"' See Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968);
Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879, 882 (4th Cir. 1956); Glover
v. Henderson, 120 Mo. 367, 377, 25 S.W. 175, 177 (1894); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 472, 117 S.E.2d 479, 489 (1960). The recoupment limitation
and its implications are discussed thoroughly in Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termi-
nation Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE L.J. 465, 479-83.
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such express termination clauses were enforced freely at common
law.109 Recently, however, some courts and commentators have ar-
gued for limitations on the enforceability of either implied or ex-
press termination clauses. 110 Because the doctrinal basis for such
limitations remains unclear, a brief review of the regulatory choices
is important to a further understanding of the termination issue.
2. Unconscionability and Good Faith as Limitations on Termi-
nation
In several recent cases, courts have invoked the related doctrines
of unconscionability and good faith to limit the exercise of contrac-
tually reserved rights to terminate distribution contracts. Both of
these justifications for judicial intervention in relational con-
tracting require critical analysis.
Although an unconscionability analysis does invite intervention
in specific cases, it is rarely invoked in agreements between com-
mercial parties because its doctrinal foundations rest on assump-
tions of imperfect information and related claims of bargaining
process unfairness.11 Those few courts using unconscionability as a
109 [S]uch right to terminate was not subject to question on the ground of unreasonable-
ness, unfairness, lack of good faith, bad faith or because of motive, intent or resultant
detriment to [the terminated dealer] ...
.. . It is beyond the power of the judiciary to engraft conditions upon the exercise
of such a contractual right.
Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1950). See also Corenswet, Inc.
v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979); Jay-
El Beverages, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 461 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1972); Myers Motors, Inc. v.
Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 291, 303 (8th Cir. 1949); Zaidan v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
228 F. Supp. 669, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1964), affd, 341 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965).
110 See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abu-
sive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 1404 (1967); Gellhorn, supra note 108;
Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-Franchisee Remedies for Termination, 29 Bus.
LAW. 227 (1973); Horton, Legal Remedies of a Distributor Terminated Pursuant to a Con-
tractual Provision of Termination Upon Notice, 3 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 88 (1970). See also
cases cited note 112 infra.
"I The unconscionability doctrine represents an ambitious effort to bring the traditional
categories of unfairness-fraud, duress, incapacity-under a single analytical umbrella. In
an earlier paper, we summarized the doctrinal developments in the following terms:
As reflected in U.C.C. § 2-302 the unconscionability principle is largely devoid of
substantive content. Some commentary has concluded that efforts to provide any an-
alytical structure are essentially futile-that unconscionability represents the subjec-
tive reactions of the particular decision-maker to the unfairness of a particular trans-
action. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
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vehicle for limiting contract rights of termination have focused on
the circumstances surrounding the exercise of the termination
right rather than on the fairness of the initial bargaining pro-
cess. 112 This is a highly unusual application of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine. Because the unconscionability rationale for judicial
intervention is a response to perceived imperfections in the bar-
gaining process, most courts have rejected the doctrine as ill-suited
to a scrutiny of agreements that are suspect due to the manner of
their performance rather than because of the circumstances sur-
U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
The major thrust of much of the unconscionability scholarship has been to seize
upon Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-302 proscribing "unfair surprise" and "oppression."
These two factors have been described respectively as "procedural" and "substan-
tive" unconscionability ... and have been used by many in an effort to merge the
traditional constraints identified earlier. See generally, Braucher, The Unconsciona-
ble Contract or Term, 31 U. PiTT. L. REV. 337 (1970); Murray, Unconscionability:
Unconscionability, 31 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconsciona-
bility Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionable Assent and
Consumer Protection, 31 U. Pirr. L. REV. 359 (1970). All of these efforts at providing
analytical clarity to the unconscionability doctrine seem to founder on the problem of
structuring a neutral principle by which a contract can be determined to be substan-
tively unfair.
The problem of substantive evaluation of the utility of the bargain can be avoided
by limiting the unconscionability principle to a process control-falling solely within
procedural unconscionability. The doctrine can thus be viewed as a method of defin-
ing bargaining abnormalities more precisely than through the traditional doctrines of
fraud and duress....
.. Illustrations of the "unfair surprise" component of bargaining unfairness
would presumptively include traditional instances of fraudulent misrepresentation, as
well as attempts to obscure the nature of the exchange by disguising relevant infor-
mation in extra language or contract terms. See, e.g., Murray, [Unconscionability:
Unconscionability, 31 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1,] 16-18; Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful
Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1974). The doctrine is typically
applied to the paradigm "fine print" provision in a standard form contract creating a
presumption that there was no consent to the bargain in fact.
Liquidated Damages, supra note 3, at nn.91 & 95.
112 See, e.g., Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 303 Minn. 442, 228 N.W.2d 562 (1975);
Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972),
modified and aff'd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1973); Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976). See generally Jordan, Unconscionability
at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REV. 813, 828-36 (1978).
In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976), the court expressly re-
jected any suggestion that a judgment barring an oil company from exercising its reserved
right of termination was based upon a perceived disparity in bargaining power. Rather, the
court held that the 10-day termination clause was unconscionable and "completely absurd"
in effect. Id. at 438-40.
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rounding their creation.11 3 Indeed, an unconscionability limitation
on unilateral rights of termination would seem justified only if
such agreements fairly could be seen as invariably resulting from
bargaining imperfections that would otherwise support interven-
tion. Yet, our prior analysis suggests legitimate reasons why in-
formed commercial parties would voluntarily assume such risks.
1 14
Under the circumstances, to deny enforcement because the termi-
nation clause is per se unconscionable seems doctrinally inapposite
and, more important, fails to identify any principled grounds for
intervention.""'
The obligation of good faith has been invoked increasingly as an
alternative basis for judicial intervention to limit the exercise of
termination provisions.116 Although the precise meaning of the
n1 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of cases have rejected the unconscionability ratio-
nale in termination cases. See, e.g., Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60
Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 34 App. Div. 2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.
2d 961 (1970); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273
N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (brewery distributorship agreement that authorized termina-
tion without cause not unconscionable because U.C.C. § 2-302 concerns the situation pre-
vailing at the formation of the contract and not subsequent hardships suffered by one of the
parties); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 720, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
, See notes 96-106 supra and accompanying text.
n Those courts and commentators that have advocated the use of unconscionability as
an instrument for reshaping legal rights of termination have all grounded their analysis on
the assumption that termination powers are used consistently and predictably to exploit
strategic advantages, and assume further that unconscionability is the most effective vehicle
to implement the desirable normative objective of eliminating such conduct. See generally
Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 938 (1979); Gellhorn, supra note 108, at 505-09; Comment, Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-302- Unilateral Right of Termination For Cause Determinable Solely by
Franchisor Unconscionable, 55 Tax. L. Rav. 541, 554-55 (1977). These analyses leave two
critical questions unaddressed: (1) What benign and socially beneficial explanations might
account, at least partially, for the use of discretionary termination clauses?, and (2) What
are the likely societal effects of a broad-gauged attack on discretionary termination clauses?
A broad-based unconscionability attack on discretionary terminations is likely to be overin-
clusive. Assuming the normative objective of minimizing "abusive" practices, social welfare
is enhanced by efforts to select instruments that are capable of isolating the disfavored
behavior while not impairing mutually beneficial contractual arrangements.
16 Although a few courts have refused to recognize a good faith limitation on discretion-
ary termination clauses, see, e.g., Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116
F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1940); Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D. Mich.
1950), an increasing number of cases have expressed a willingness to limit the right of termi-
nation where it appears the termination was not exercised in good faith. See, e.g., Randolph
v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1386 (6th Cir. 1975) (distribution con-
tract); deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 1100 (4th Cir. 1971) (same);
McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (D. Mass. 1980) (employment
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good faith obligation remains as ambiguous as does the unconscio-
nability rationale, here the focus is directed toward the perform-
ance behavior of the parties rather than the bargaining process.11
Good faith is best conceived as a rule for policing cheating on the
terms of the contract or other opportunistic behavior designed to
redistribute risks already allocated by the agreement.118 Indeed,
the risk of such opportunistic behavior is heightened measurably
when relational contractors agree to a unilateral right of termina-
tion. In order for a termination provision to offer meaningful reas-
surances of performance efforts, the principal must be confident of
his ability to invoke the clause without being required to bear the
burden of proving a violation of the performance obligation. Yet,
the cost of such broadly conceived termination authority is an invi-
tation to the principal to engage in opportunistic behavior at the
expense of the terminated agent. As an extreme example, a termi-
nation clause obviously would be invoked in bad faith should a
franchisor terminate an agreement immediately following the re-
ceipt of the franchisee's capital contribution. Thus, in RLM Asso-
contract); Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153, 157 (1977) (sales contract);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977) (commis-
sion sales contract); Morge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551
(1974).
117 Both the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code impose a mandatory obliga-
tion of good faith in the performance and enforcement of contractual obligations. See
U.C.C. §§ 1-102(3), 1-203; Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Con-
tract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,
216-19 (1968).
118 The critical challenge for any definition of good faith is whether it can distinguish
between the normatively acceptable decision to breach and pay compensatory damages, and
the kinds of strategic contracting behavior that are normatively undesirable. Focusing on
the welfare effects of the behavior may provide a principled distinction. A decision to breach
and allocate resources to alternative uses is efficiency-enhancing conduct so long as the
breacher "buys" out of the contract by paying the appropriate quantum of damages. See
Liquidated Damages, supra note 3, at 558-59. On the other hand, strategic behavior
designed to exploit a contractually created monopoly position-for example, a professional
athlete threatening nonperformance in order to extort a larger compensation-has no so-
cially optimizing effects. Rather, such opportunistic behavior only redistributes portions of
an already allocated contractual pie. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 1, at 300-
02. Thus, at least in this context, bad faith can be defined as intentional efforts to use
contractually created discretion or other strategic opportunities to secure a larger share of
the anticipated gains from an existing contract. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico,
117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) (preexisting duty rule as a bar to bad faith modification); Wolf v.
Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (duress as a bar
to bad faith termination).
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ciates, Inc. v. Carter Manufacturing Corp.,1 9 the court acknowl-
edged a prima facie showing of "bad faith" termination where the
evidence established that the termination was motivated by a de-
sire to avoid paying commissions earned through the distributor's
efforts.12 0 Although such "red faced" cases of bad faith seem to
present little difficulty, it is concern with the incidence of more
subtle manifestations of this behavior that animates courts and
legislators seeking to limit termination rights.
3. Good Cause Limitations on Termination
The desire to reduce the incidence of "cheating" behavior by
principals explains some of the reluctance to enforce termination
agreements fully. A number of legislatures also have imposed
"good cause" limitations on the enforcement of unilateral termina-
tion privileges in franchise contracts. 2 " In addition, increasing
numbers of relational contractors have framed their termination
agreements so as to require "good cause" before a unilateral termi-
nation privilege can be exercised. 22 On one level, the addition of a
good cause gloss on termination agreements merely serves to
sharpen the presumed allocation of risks under a legally mandated
good faith obligation. Thus, although termination at will literally
offers the principal the opportunity to terminate for any reason or
no reason, including a bad reason, such discretion does not include
the privilege to engage in an opportunistic exercise of termination
rights. This interpretation of good cause merely mirrors the good
faith limitation suggested earlier, however. Thus, a difficult ques-
tion arises when the issue focuses not on opportunism, but on
changed conditions that cause alternative contractual arrange-
ments to appear more attractive to the terminating party.
119 356 Mass. 718, 248 N.E.2d 646 (1969).
120 Id. See also Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 918 (1980) (fraud and bad faith found in company's threat to terminate if dealer han-
dled competitive products); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (termination vitiated by proof that NCR had salesmen "at their
mercy").
121 See, e.g., state statutes collected in STATE BUSINESS FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE AND RELA-
TIONSHIP LAWS (CCH) 1 306-401.6 (1978). See also Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 158 N.J. Super. 455, 386 A.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (interpreting good
cause under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act).




In J & S Home Realty, Inc. v. Anaconda Co., 123 the court ex-
plicitly considered whether a manufacturer's decision to go out of
the building materials business in good faith and for business
reasons was "cause" sufficient to terminate the distributor's con-
tract. The court concluded that a good cause limitation in the con-
tract must contain meaning beyond mere good faith. Although a
termination based on changed business conditions might well be
consistent with the obligation of good faith, the good cause limita-
tion imposed additional restrictions on termination. Absent evi-
dence of failure of performance by the distributor, changed condi-
tions making alternative arrangements more advantageous to the
manufacturer did not justify termination under the good cause
limitation.
124
The preceding analysis confirms that the precise meaning and
reach of the various limitations on contractually specified rights of
termination remains unclear. The uncertain effect of such limita-
tions on unilateral termination agreements jeopardizes the ability
of parties to use termination as a means of reassurance where per-
formance standards are difficult to police. The uncertainty costs of
limitations on termination are a product of the failure to isolate
and define adequately the relative risks embraced in a termination
provision. In the following section, we propose a model for allocat-
ing the different risks that induce a decision to terminate.
C. A Termination Model
Assume that, in our initial hypothetical case, manufacturer and
distributor negotiate a ten-year distribution contract providing
that either party may terminate the agreement on ten-day notice
"for any reason with or without cause." The agreement is termi-
nated by the manufacturer after six years because the distributor
was "unable to sustain a continuing pattern of growth. 12 5 The dis-
tributor appeals the termination, arguing that exercise of the ter-
mination clause should be limited on grounds of unconscionability,
good faith, or good cause. How would such a termination issue be
resolved?
123 172 Mont. 236, 563 P.2d 566 (1977).
114 Id. at 239-40, 563 P.2d at 567-68.
125 The facts of the hypothetical are based loosely on those in Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979).
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Three distinct risks are encompassed in the manufacturer's uni-
lateral option to terminate the contract. The first risk inherent in
an unqualified right of termination is the vulnerability of the dis-
tributor to cheating or strategic attempts by the manufacturer to
extort additional compensation. A second risk is the possibility
that contingencies may materialize that cause the manufacturer to
regret having entered into the relationship, thus precipitating ter-
mination. The third and final risk is the inherent possibility that
termination may be induced by the distributor's failure to achieve
the required standard of performance. Because the allocation of
these risks will influence the behavior of relational bargainers, it is
useful to examine the legal treatment of termination agreements in
terms of the risk-bearing consequences of the legal rule.
1. Allocation of Termination Risks in a Friction-Free
Environment
In order to assess the effects of any particular termination rule,
we first assume that, although future events may be uncertain,
accurate retrospective information is accessible for purposes of ad-
judication. We assume also that legal process costs are negligible,
so that the theoretical gains from an otherwise beneficial regula-
tory rule are never counterbalanced by implementation costs. We
relax these assumptions below When we discuss the practical com-
promises that may be dictated in a more realistic setting.
The risks of opportunistic termination and best efforts failure
can be allocated without great theoretical difficulty. Because
cheating and efforts to prevent cheating represent a dead-weight
social loss, limitations on intentional bad faith behavior are always
optimal when enforcement costs are negligible.128 In order to main-
tain the appropriate disincentives to engage in socially disfavored
activity, the risk of cheating or other opportunistic behavior must
be borne,, therefore, by the party with the discretionary power to
terminate the contract. On the other hand, the distributor is the
optimal bearer of the risk of a failure to achieve a best efforts stan-
dard of performance. The distributor can exercise some control
over the level of efforts invested in his business activities, and thus
is the efficient bearer of the risk that his distribution efforts will
126 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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not achieve the joint-maximizing output.1 2 7 Indeed, we suggest that
the decision to bargain for a termination clause is motivated
largely by the opportunity to reduce expected agency costs through
minimizing the risk of a failure of best efforts.
A more complex analysis is required in evaluating the risk that
changed circumstances may cause either party-in this case the
manufacturer-to regret the arrangement. In conventional con-
tracts, the risk of such a "regret contingency" typically is allocated
to the party seeking to terminate; he presumably enjoys the com-
parative advantage in bearing the risk of his own disappointment.
In relational contexts, however, it is often impractical for the par-
ties to specify and allocate such risks accurately in advance. Ab-
sent an ability to identify systematically which party is better able
to bear the risk of regret, how is the risk to be assigned?
The critically important variable in determining the optimal as-
signment of the risk of regret contingencies is whether the parties
select an indefinite duration or a fixed term contract. As we sug-
gest above, parties to relational exchange may in some cases elect
to use sequential or indefinite duration contracts. Assume that,
rather than a ten-year fixed term, the manufacturer and distribu-
tor agree to an indefinite duration distribution contract. In this
case, the risk of regret is assigned to the distributor because it rep-
resents the most plausible explanation for the selection of this par-
ticular method of economizing on transactions costs' A sequential
or indefinite term contract permits either party to adjust to events
that may cause regret over the original compensation arrangement.
Additional covenants by the distributor not to compete and by the
manufacturer to buy back tangible assets are methods of retaining
some capacity to encourage, within this flexible environment,
transaction-specific investments by both parties. In order to retain
the presumed risk allocation of the parties, a manufacturer would,
therefore, be entitled to terminate an indefinite duration contract
in order to pursue a change in marketing strategy. If termination
in fact does not represent the joint-maximizing outcome consider-
ing the interests of both parties, the terminated distributor would
be free to bargain for a redivision of the joint contractual product
in order to induce the disappointed manufacturer not to terminate.
The risk consequences associated with negotiating a fixed term
127 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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contract such as the one proposed above are simple: the risk of the
manufacturer's regret is shifted from the distributor to the disap-
pointed manufacturer. The decision to assume voluntarily the risk
of uncertain or unforseeable events presumably is motivated by the
corresponding gains that the fixed term agreement offers in terms
of fostering asymmetrical investments in transaction-specific as-
sets. By providing the vulnerable party with the right to prevent a
termination, such an agreement requires the disappointed party to
buy out the other's difficult-to-value specific investments in order
to secure a release from a now-regretted arrangement.
In sum, optimal risk allocation requires that in all cases the risk
of bad faith termination be borne by the manufacturer and the
risk of a failure of best efforts be borne by the distributor. Because
the risk of the manufacturer's regret can be assigned only by spe-
cific agreement, the risk is assigned to either party depending on
whether they negotiate a fixed term or an indefinite duration
agreement. This analysis suggests that in the case of indefinite
term contracts, the right of termination should be constrained only
where necessary to discourage strategic behavior. Where the agree-
ment calls for a fixed term, however, even a broadly discretionary
termination clause should optimally be subject to additional limi-
tations-whether based on unconscionability, good faith, or "good
cause"-whenever the terminating party also attempts to shift the
risk of regret contingencies.
The model formulated above is incomplete, however. Even in in-
definite term contracts, an additional limitation arises when a rela-
tionship necessitates highly transaction-specific investments by a
party subject to termination, thus increasing that party's vulner-
ability. The view that this vulnerability supports the use of recoup-
ment limitations is not accepted universally. If one regards the
threat of termination to be exclusively a device to motivate the
performance of an agent, then a recoupment guarantee limits the
penalty for nonperformance and inefficiently attenuates the im-
pact of a useful enforcement device.12 8 One simple response is to
observe that there is an optimal amount of ex ante sanction for
any activity, and the threat of loss of large transaction-specific in-
vestments may constitute inefficient over sanctioning. There are,
128 See Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70
AM. EcON. REV. 356 (1980).
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however, at least two additional reasons why we are not persuaded
that recoupment guarantees must be regarded as economically
inefficient. First, if the objective is merely to increase the size of
the nonperformance penalty, there are many alternative ways of
doing so. More important, however, is the fact that the recoupment
limitation must be analyzed as a device affecting the behavior of
the terminator as much as of the terminated. Bad faith termina-
tion will be an especially strong risk where the agent's legitimate
profits reach a level unanticipated at the time of contracting.
Hence, it may be sensible for the party subject to termination to
regard the recoupment feature as, in effect, a "penalty" intended
to deter a potential bad faith terminator.
The preceding analytical model provides useful insights about
existing patterns of legal enforcement. Contracts for an indefinite
duration may be terminated at will except in gross instances of bad
faith 129 or cases in which the terminated party has yet to recoup a
specialized capital investment in the enterprise.130 The model also
provides a useful framework for analysis of the judicial treatment
of unilateral termination under fixed term agreements. A signifi-
cant number of recent cases involve termination of dealerships by
oil companies, reflecting the change in marketing strategies moti-
vated by the unanticipated rise in crude oil prices during the
1970's.11 In these and analogous circumstances, termination limi-
12* See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1972), modified and aff'd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1973);
notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
130 See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
131 The spectacular increase in the retail price of gasoline following the 1973 oil embargo
altered the pre-embargo marketing strategy in which sales of associated products and repair
services were promoted and gasoline sold as an ancillary service. This strategy was based on
the assumption that the demand for gasoline was inelastic over the relevant range. Price
increases produced by the embargo revealed consumer sensitivity to price and, in turn, en-
couraged the development of low-cost sales methods, such as self-service purchases. Existing
dealers, meanwhile, had substantial investments in automobile servicing and repair facilities
and were reluctant to shift to the cheaper self-serve format. Hence, the stage was set for a
substantial number of terminations, resulting, in turn, in a significant amount of litigation.
See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918
(1980); Pickerign v. Pasco Marketing, Inc., 303 Minn. 442, 228 N.W.2d 562 (1975); Westfield
Centre Serv. Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 158 N.J. Super. 455, 386 A.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. Ch. Div.
1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1972), modified and affd, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1973);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978); Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
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tations have been imposed consistently on fixed term contracts
when manufacturers or producers have attempted to disen-
franchise dealers in order to pursue new marketing strategies.132 At
the same time, courts consistently have enforced such termination
agreements where a best efforts or other performance failure has
been shown clearly.133
If the risk of performance failure is the only risk allocated to the
distributor by a unilateral termination clause in a fixed term con-
tract, why would the parties negotiate such an overly broad provi-
sion, thereby inviting improper attempts to terminate? The an-
swer, of course, is that the assumption of negligible enforcement
costs necessarily distorts the outcome. In a friction-free environ-
ment, the terminating manufacturer would be able to allege and
establish at no cost the appropriate best efforts failure in order to
justify the decision to terminate. In this environment, the parties
would never agree to the clause specified above. In order to appre-
ciate the true significance of such provisions, therefore, it is neces-
sary to examine the effects of enforcement costs on the optimal
allocation of termination risks.
2. Problems of Proof, Process, and Error Costs
By relaxing the assumptions of perfect measurement and zero
process costs, we are able to evaluate the efficiency of limitations
'32 See cases cited note 131 supra. See also Michael Todd & Co. v. Lecal Co., 583 F.2d
1056 (8th Cir. 1978) (distributor entitled to damages where manufacturer terminated in or-
der to deal directly with consumers); Whiteis v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 531 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1977) (attempt by manufacturer to terminate dealer in
order to change from exclusive distribution scheme to competitive site franchises barred by
obligation of good faith); Junikki Imports, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Co., 335 F. Supp. 593 (N.D.
Ill. 1971) (automobile manufacturer who wished to change marketing strategies prevented
by obligation of good faith from using termination as means of eliminating dealer from the
market).
133 See, e.g., Excello Wine Co. v. Monsieur Henri Wines, Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 203, 209 (S.D.
Ohio 1979) ("Monsieur Henri's best interests were no longer being served by the distributor-
ship with Excello."); International Harvester Co. v. Calvin, 353 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (assuming that the dealer made its required showing of rebuttable bad faith with
an assertion that the reason for termination was its protest of a neighboring dealership, this
was overcome by the supplier's evidence of inadequate "market penetration" as an indepen-
dent reason for termination); Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 212 Mass. 352, 99 N.E. 221
(1912) (agent denied recovery of damages for wrongful termination where evidence indicated
a failure to use "best energies"); Freeman v. Danal Jewelry Co., 397 A.2d 1323 (R.I. 1979)




on termination rights from a more practical standpoint. Under a
legal regime limiting the right of termination, the terminating
party must determine how to establish that the termination option
is being exercised for a risk that has been allocated to the termi-
nated party. Given the enormously difficult problems of proving a
violation of the performance obligation,- 4 the issue in termination
cases inevitably turns on the allocation of presumptions and bur-
dens of proof.
One resolution of our hypothetical termination case would be for
the court to adopt the procedural mechanism suggested by the re-
cent decision in International Harvester Co. v. Calvin.13 5 In Inter-
national Harvester, the manufacturer exercised a unilateral termi-
nation privilege, alleging that the distributor failed to achieve
satisfactory sales performance. The agent successfully challenged
the termination before a state agency, but the appeals court re-
versed. In sustaining the termination, the court explicitly allocated
to the distributor the burden of establishing that International
Harvester's termination was motivated either by opportunism or
regret rather than because of the alleged performance failure. Once
a prima facie claim of improper termination was presented, the
burden shifted to International Harvester to establish a failure of
performance as an independent and sufficient reason to termi-
nate.'3 6 Presumably, the power of termination would have been
limited by the court only where the distributor was able to estab-
lish either an inference of bad faith or evidence of changed circum-
stances that suggested that International Harvester was seeking al-
ternative distribution arrangements, and where International
Harvester, in turn, was unable to prove its allegations of unsatis-
factory performance.1
3 7
As a theoretical proposition, it is impossible to predict whether
such an allocation of presumptions and burdens of proof is socially
optimal. The relevant empirical question, however, is clear. It is
efficient for the legal system to regulate unilateral termination
See notes 65-74 supra and accompanying text.
1" 353 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
136 Id. at 147-48.
137 A similar procedural framework was suggested implicitly in Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979), where the
court sustained a termination based on Amana's allegations of poor sales volume and the
distributor failed to suggest any "improper" reasons underlying the termination.
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where the reduction in the social costs of improper terminations is
not overbalanced by concomitant increases in agency costs that re-
sult from the diminished efficacy of termination provisions as a
form of contractual bonding.
Although there are no data suggesting how this question is to be
resolved, some plausible empirical assumptions can be advanced.
First, instances of bad faith terminations are likely to be infre-
quent due to the existence of extralegal sanctions against strategic
behavior in continuing relationships. Thus, manufacturers with es-
tablished commercial distribution contracts will incur substantial
"goodwill" losses if they attempt to exploit a discretionary termi-
nation authority. Furthermore, in many distribution contexts, anti-
trust claims, carrying treble damages liability, are routinely filed
against producers as a "penal" sanction for disfavored termina-
tions. Second, these distribution and franchise contracts often re-
quire asymmetrical specialized investment and consequently are
frequently characterized by fixed term agreements under which
the manufacturer implicitly assumes the risk of regret over
changed conditions.
Given the assumed effectiveness of extralegal sanctions, termina-
tion for reasons other than a failure of best efforts will be a cost-
effective strategy for such a manufacturer only where changed con-
ditions producing regret create the prospect of substantial and
continuing losses. This suggests that the evidence of such exoge-
nous conditions will be accessible to a terminated dealer seeking to
establish a wrongful termination. These generalizations would sup-
port, in turn, a presumption of best efforts failure that the distrib-
utor must rebut by establishing that termination was motivated ei-
ther by opportunism or by regret over changed conditions.
The difficult proof problem associated with termination clauses
does suggest that courts will be more inclined to regulate termina-
tion where alternative forms of monitoring or bonding are available
at low incremental cost. The existence of close substitutes reduces
the relative value of unilateral termination as a device to police
best efforts agreements. This hypothesis appears confirmed by cas-
ual analysis of the cases. For example, the most rigorous limita-
tions on termination have occured in the franchising context.
These forms of relational contracting offer more and closer sub-
stitutes for minimizing agency costs than do those other relation-
ships where the common law presumption that termination clauses
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are fully enforceable has been retained.
The fact that only crude observations are possible from the cases.
indicates the failure of current legal rules to encourage parties to
specify and isolate more carefully the various risks that are encom-
passed in termination cases. Carefully developed procedural rules
can reduce the risks of "improper" termination while preserving
some ability to terminate for best efforts failure even though proof
of such failure is unavailable.
Isolating the relevance of the burden of proof permits the identi-
fication of a final question. Although the parties may be unable to
specify the risks in advance, they may well be able to allocate the
burden of proof. Should individually tailored allocations be sanc-
tioned? If the preceding analysis is plausible, the answer is clearly
an affirmative one. The parties obviously are better able to iden-
tify comparative advantages in establishing the causes for termina-
tion behavior. Unless such an arrangement represents an obvious
effort to cheat, such an allocation of burdens enhances efficiency.
IV. CONCLUSION
Executory contracts allocate the risk of various contingencies
whose occurrence would influence the costs or benefits of a con-
templated activity. By in effect selling a risk to the other party,
who presumably anticipates'a lower cost of bearing that risk, each
bargainer reduces the costs of his own risk portfolio. This article
has examined the behavior of contracting parties when the rele-
vant contingencies are deemed too uncertain or too complex to
permit the associated risks to be identified, described, and as-
signed appropriately at the time of contracting. Although such cir-
cumstances render relational contractors unable to exchange risks
in precise, conventional ways, the process of negotiating such an
executory contract is nonetheless motivated by cost-minimizing
incentives.
This cost-minimizing hypothesis is confirmed by examining two
terms commonly found in relational contracts: a broadly defined
"best efforts" standard of performance and a discretionary term-
ination privilege. The vague concept of best efforts can most sen-
sibly be construed as requiring the level of effort necessary to
maximize the joint net product flowing from the contractual rela-
tionship. This joint-maximization criterion is a plausible norm for
all cooperative contractual relationships where the parties have not
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specified a precise standard of required performance; it produces
the largest possible net product for ultimate division between the
parties. Unfortunately, the gains from this cooperative objective
can be realized fully only if the parties are able to provide an ap-
propriate monitoring/bonding package-perhaps incorporating a
discretionary termination provision-that induces the optimal out-
put. Although such provisions often appear to give one party an
unfettered opportunity to exploit the other, they also serve as a
risk-allocating mechanism designed to reduce the agency costs of
relational exchange. The tension between the monitoring function
and the exploitation opportunity is an inevitable consequence of
many business environments.
The decisions reached by courts interpreting best efforts and
termination agreements are generally consistent with the kinds of
tradeoffs that we ascribe to parties motivated by cost-minimiza-
tion. Standard legal doctrine, however, has failed to articulate any
explicit rationalization or explanation of these intuitively plausible
outcomes. The consequence has been a level of uncertainty and
ambiguity in the case law that blunts the social utility of the legal
rules involved. A reconciliation of doctrine and result in these
cases may serve two purposes: to facilitate the understanding of
those legal counsel who attempt to craft appropriate mechanisms
for allocating risks under exceptionally complex and uncertain con-
ditions, and also to sharpen the courts' perception of the tensions
inherent in the mechanisms chosen and the policies designed to
regulate them.
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